http://github.com/dylang/node-rsssite-lib/media/favicon.pngWebpage HTML Export plugin for ObsidianThu, 07 May 2026 20:06:00 GMTThu, 07 May 2026 20:05:43 GMT60Ch. 1—Purposes of Criminal Law — retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation (pp. 1–16)
Ch. 2—Actus Reus — voluntary act, omissions on legal duty, possession, status (pp. 25–90)
Ch. 3—Mens Rea — MPC mental states, mistake, intoxication, strict liability (pp. 100–154)
Ch. 4—Causation — but-for, proximate, intervening causes (pp. 159–88)
Ch. 5—Accomplice Liability — principals, accessories, aiding & abetting (pp. 193–237)
Ch. 6—Attempt — substantial step, abandonment, impossibility (pp. 257–91)
Ch. 7—Conspiracy — agreement, overt act, Wharton's Rule, Pinkerton (pp. 299–365)
Ch. 8—Homicide — murder degrees, felony murder, manslaughter (pp. 375–439)
Ch. 12—Defenses — justifications & excuses (pp. 589–704) Purposefully — conscious objective to engage in conduct/cause result. Knowingly — practically certain. Recklessly — consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk. Negligently — should have been aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. Greater satisfies the lesser: P→K→R→N (one direction only).
Inchoate offenses: Attempt, Conspiracy — punish dangerous purpose before harm.
Vicarious liability: Accomplice Liability, Pinkerton Rule (in Ch. 7) — convict for others' acts.
Defenses: Justifications (act was right) vs. Excuses (actor not blameworthy). Step 1: Look at the question prompt. Step 2: Read facts strategically. Step 3: Outline the answer. Step 4: Write with IRAC: Issue Rule Application ← longest part; apply the rule to the facts. Conclusion One-page (8.5"×11") sheet of personal notes/outline allowed (both sides). No other materials, books, outlines, or commercial study aids. Format: multiple choice. Typed on laptop unless otherwise approved. ]]>outline/outline.htmlOutline/Outline.mdThu, 07 May 2026 20:04:43 GMTActual Cause + Proximate Cause.
Actual Cause (Cause-in-Fact) But-for cause: but for ∆'s conduct, the result would not have occurred when and as it did. Twin Fires / Summers v. Tice Problem: if two independent acts each would have been sufficient, both are treated as actual causes (substantial-factor test).
Legal/Proximate Cause Even if actual cause exists, no liability if a superseding intervening cause breaks the causal chain. Dependent intervening cause (responsive to ∆'s act, e.g., medical malpractice after wounding): does not break the chain. Independent intervening cause (free, deliberate, informed third-party act, or freak natural event): does break the chain. Test: was the intervening act foreseeable? If foreseeable, ∆ remains liable. MPC § 2.03: causation is satisfied if (1) conduct is an antecedent but-for cause and (2) the result is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a just bearing on liability. Cases here:
Stephenson v. State, 179 N.E. 633 (Ind. 1932) — proximate cause; victim's suicide as foreseeable.
People v. Acosta, 284 Cal. Rptr. 117 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) — high-speed chase; foreseeability of helicopter collision.
State v. McGee — dependent vs. independent intervening cause. Reading: pp. 159–63, 167–73, 186–88.]]>outline/ch.-4—causation/ch.-4—causation.htmlOutline/Ch. 4—Causation/Ch. 4—Causation.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:49:58 GMTStephenson v. State, 179 N.E. 633 (Ind. 1932) — victim's suicide foreseeable; ∆ remains proximate cause.
People v. Acosta, 284 Cal. Rptr. 117 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) — high-speed chase; helicopter collision foreseeable.
State v. McGee — medical treatment as dependent intervening cause.
See Actual Cause for the cause-in-fact step.]]>outline/ch.-4—causation/proximate-cause.htmlOutline/Ch. 4—Causation/Proximate Cause.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:49:40 GMTInfancy.]]>outline/ch.-12—defenses/excuses/in-re-devon-t.,-584-a.2d-1287-(md.-ct.-spec.-app.-1991).htmlOutline/Ch. 12—Defenses/Excuses/In re Devon T., 584 A.2d 1287 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:47:53 GMTInsanity.]]>outline/ch.-12—defenses/excuses/m'naughten's-case,-8-eng.-rep.-718-(h.l.-1843).htmlOutline/Ch. 12—Defenses/Excuses/M'Naughten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:47:47 GMTDuress.]]>outline/ch.-12—defenses/excuses/u.s.-v.-contento-pachon,-723-f.2d-691-(9th-cir.-1984).htmlOutline/Ch. 12—Defenses/Excuses/U.S. v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1984).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:47:40 GMTU.S. v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1984) — duress in drug-courier context. ]]>outline/ch.-12—defenses/excuses/duress.htmlOutline/Ch. 12—Defenses/Excuses/Duress.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:47:32 GMTIn re Devon T., 584 A.2d 1287 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) — applying the rebuttable presumption. ]]>outline/ch.-12—defenses/excuses/infancy.htmlOutline/Ch. 12—Defenses/Excuses/Infancy.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:47:25 GMTM'Naughten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). Irresistible Impulse Test (volitional supplement): ∆ knew the act was wrong, but a mental disease prevented ∆ from controlling the conduct. Durham / "Product" Test (rare): the act was the product of mental disease. MPC § 4.01 (Substantial Capacity Test): ∆ lacked substantial capacity to: Appreciate the criminality (or wrongfulness) of conduct, OR Conform conduct to the requirements of law. Federal Insanity Defense Reform Act (1984): ∆ unable to appreciate the nature/quality or wrongfulness, due to severe mental disease/defect (cognitive only; volitional prong abolished post-Hinckley). Affirmative defense; burden often on ∆ (sometimes by clear and convincing evidence). Successful insanity defense usually results in commitment, not release. Insanity = mental state at time of crime. Competency = mental state at time of trial (whether ∆ can understand proceedings and assist counsel). ]]>outline/ch.-12—defenses/excuses/insanity.htmlOutline/Ch. 12—Defenses/Excuses/Insanity.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:47:19 GMTInsanity — at the time of the act, ∆ was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of conduct or conform to the law due to mental disease or defect.
Infancy — children below a certain age are presumed incapable of forming criminal mens rea.
Duress — ∆ was coerced by an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm to commit the offense. (Involuntary intoxication and certain mistake-of-law claims are also excuses.)
U.S. v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1984) — duress.
M'Naughten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843) — classic insanity test.
In re Devon T., 584 A.2d 1287 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) — infancy. ]]>outline/ch.-12—defenses/excuses/excuses.htmlOutline/Ch. 12—Defenses/Excuses/Excuses.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:47:09 GMTNecessity & Choice of Evils.]]>outline/ch.-12—defenses/justifications/state-v.-crawford,-521-a.2d-1193-(md.-1987).htmlOutline/Ch. 12—Defenses/Justifications/State v. Crawford, 521 A.2d 1193 (Md. 1987).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:46:57 GMTDefense of Dwelling.]]>outline/ch.-12—defenses/justifications/state-v.-anderson,-972-p.2d-32-(okla.-crim.-app.-1998).htmlOutline/Ch. 12—Defenses/Justifications/State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 32 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:46:47 GMTSelf-Defense (battered-defendant doctrine).]]>outline/ch.-12—defenses/justifications/bechtel-v.-state,-840-p.2d-1-(okla.-crim.-app.-1992).htmlOutline/Ch. 12—Defenses/Justifications/Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:46:40 GMTSelf-Defense.]]>outline/ch.-12—defenses/justifications/state-v.-marr,-765-a.2d-645-(2001).htmlOutline/Ch. 12—Defenses/Justifications/State v. Marr, 765 A.2d 645 (2001).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:46:30 GMTSelf-Defense.]]>outline/ch.-12—defenses/justifications/brown-v.-united-states,-256-u.s.-335-(1921).htmlOutline/Ch. 12—Defenses/Justifications/Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:46:20 GMTState v. Crawford, 521 A.2d 1193 (Md. 1987) — necessity available where ∆ involuntarily came into possession of a handgun while under attack. ]]>outline/ch.-12—defenses/justifications/necessity-&-choice-of-evils.htmlOutline/Ch. 12—Defenses/Justifications/Necessity & Choice of Evils.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:46:09 GMTState v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 32 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (Oklahoma's § 1289.25 — defines "occupant" broadly to include guests). "This defense traditionally required a reasonable belief that an intruder threatened harm to the occupants of a dwelling, but new statutory rights to use deadly force have modified or eliminated this requirement."]]>outline/ch.-12—defenses/justifications/defense-of-dwelling.htmlOutline/Ch. 12—Defenses/Justifications/Defense of Dwelling.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:45:58 GMTSelf-Defense, with one shift: Reasonable belief that the other person is being subjected to an unlawful use of force. Only if that unlawful force is deadly may the defender use deadly force. If, unbeknownst to the rescuer, the force used was actually lawful, the defense was unavailable—the defender stood "in the shoes" of the person being defended, who had no right to defend himself. Modern statutes and cases reject this approach: a defender who reasonably believes the other was being unlawfully attacked retains the defense. Strangers count, not just family members—reasonable belief about lawfulness is the key, not relationship. ]]>outline/ch.-12—defenses/justifications/defense-of-others.htmlOutline/Ch. 12—Defenses/Justifications/Defense of Others.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:45:49 GMTState v. Marr, 765 A.2d 645 (2001). Modern courts may admit expert testimony about battering experiences to inform reasonableness of ∆'s belief in imminence.
See Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992). Severity of Threat: Nondeadly: ∆ may use nondeadly force when ∆ reasonably believes the other is about to inflict unlawful bodily harm. Deadly: ∆ may use deadly force ONLY IF ∆ reasonably believes the other is about to inflict unlawful death or serious bodily injury. Cases:
Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921) — no duty to retreat.
State v. Marr, 765 A.2d 645 (2001) — perfect vs. imperfect.
Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) — battered-woman self-defense. ]]>outline/ch.-12—defenses/justifications/self-defense.htmlOutline/Ch. 12—Defenses/Justifications/Self-Defense.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:45:43 GMTSelf-Defense — reasonable belief in necessity of force to repel an imminent unlawful attack.
Defense of Others — reasonable belief that another is being subjected to an unlawful use of force.
Defense of Dwelling — limitations on use of deadly force against intruders.
Necessity / Choice of Evils — violation of law to avoid a greater harm. Honest and reasonable belief that the conduct was necessary. Imminence (or, MPC: "immediately necessary on the present occasion"). Proportionality of force. Clean hands (∆ not the aggressor).
Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921) — no duty to retreat (Holmes).
State v. Marr, 765 A.2d 645 (2001) — perfect vs. imperfect self-defense.
Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) — battered-defendant self-defense.
State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 32 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) — defense-of-dwelling.
State v. Crawford, 521 A.2d 1193 (Md. 1987) — necessity. ]]>outline/ch.-12—defenses/justifications/justifications.htmlOutline/Ch. 12—Defenses/Justifications/Justifications.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:45:26 GMTJustification Defenses — the technical commission of a criminal act is viewed by society as justified and thus not appropriate for criminal punishment. The act was right, not just excused.
Excuse Defenses — ∆ committed a wrongful act, but for reasons that exempt ∆ personally from blame (insanity, infancy, duress, intoxication-related cognitive failure).
Justifications Self-Defense Defense of Others Defense of Dwelling Necessity / Choice of Evils
Excuses Insanity (M'Naughten and beyond) Infancy Duress
Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921) — no duty to retreat; "detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife."
State v. Marr, 765 A.2d 645 (2001) — perfect vs. imperfect self-defense.
Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) — battered-defendant self-defense.
State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 32 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) — defense-of-dwelling "Make My Day" law.
State v. Crawford, 521 A.2d 1193 (Md. 1987) — necessity / choice of evils.
U.S. v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1984) — duress as excuse.
M'Naughten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843) — insanity test.
In re Devon T., 584 A.2d 1287 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) — infancy. Reading: pp. 589–94, 598–601, 605–15, 618–24, 631–37 (Justifications); 641–47, 649–52, 696–704 (Excuses).]]>outline/ch.-12—defenses/ch.-12—defenses.htmlOutline/Ch. 12—Defenses/Ch. 12—Defenses.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:45:20 GMTManslaughter (involuntary). ]]>outline/ch.-8—homicide/manslaughter/people-v.-mccoy.htmlOutline/Ch. 8—Homicide/Manslaughter/People v. McCoy.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:44:57 GMTManslaughter (involuntary).]]>outline/ch.-8—homicide/manslaughter/state-v.-powell.htmlOutline/Ch. 8—Homicide/Manslaughter/State v. Powell.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:44:48 GMTManslaughter (involuntary).]]>outline/ch.-8—homicide/manslaughter/noakes-v.-virginia.htmlOutline/Ch. 8—Homicide/Manslaughter/Noakes v. Virginia.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:44:40 GMTFelony Murder (temporal-scope analysis).]]>outline/ch.-8—homicide/murder/people-v.-portillo.htmlOutline/Ch. 8—Homicide/Murder/People v. Portillo.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:44:32 GMTFelony Murder.]]>outline/ch.-8—homicide/murder/state-v.-blair,-228-p.3d-564-(2010).htmlOutline/Ch. 8—Homicide/Murder/State v. Blair, 228 P.3d 564 (2010).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:44:26 GMTGeneral Rule.]]>outline/ch.-8—homicide/general-rule/state-v.-burley.htmlOutline/Ch. 8—Homicide/General Rule/State v. Burley.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:44:18 GMTFirst Degree Murder. Key takeaway: premeditation = actual reflection, however brief.]]>outline/ch.-8—homicide/murder/state-v.-ramirez,-945-p.2d-376-(ariz.-1997).htmlOutline/Ch. 8—Homicide/Murder/State v. Ramirez, 945 P.2d 376 (Ariz. 1997).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:44:13 GMTManslaughter.]]>outline/ch.-8—homicide/murder/massachusetts-v.-hinds,-927-n.e.2d-1009-(mass.-2010).htmlOutline/Ch. 8—Homicide/Murder/Massachusetts v. Hinds, 927 N.E.2d 1009 (Mass. 2010).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:44:05 GMTFirst Degree Murder. Also: deadly-weapon rule — intentional use of a deadly weapon authorizes a permissive inference of intent to kill.]]>outline/ch.-8—homicide/murder/state-v.-davis,-905-s.w.2d-921-(1995).htmlOutline/Ch. 8—Homicide/Murder/State v. Davis, 905 S.W.2d 921 (1995).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:43:56 GMTFirst Degree Murder.]]>outline/ch.-8—homicide/murder/state-v.-hope,-137-n.e.3d-549-(ohio-2019).htmlOutline/Ch. 8—Homicide/Murder/State v. Hope, 137 N.E.3d 549 (Ohio 2019).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:43:52 GMTMassachusetts v. Hinds, 927 N.E.2d 1009 (Mass. 2010) (provocation must come from the victim). Imperfect self-defense (killing on unreasonable but honest belief in necessity) also reduces murder to voluntary manslaughter in many jurisdictions. An unintentional killing. CL Majority (criminally negligent homicide): ∆ should have known of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. Gross deviation from the standard of care—so gross that public-law punishment is warranted. MPC § 210.3 / § 210.4: Recklessness (manslaughter), OR What would otherwise be murder, but committed under extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation.
"I know this could kill someone... and I don't care." → Extreme Recklessness / Depraved Heart Murder (Second Degree Murder). "I know there's a risk, but I underestimate it." → Recklessness (MPC manslaughter; few CL jurxs.). "I didn't realize the big risk, but I should have." → Criminal Negligence (involuntary manslaughter). Both are unintentional. Depraved heart: extreme recklessness, malice imputed. Involuntary manslaughter: criminal negligence OR ordinary recklessness. Cases:
Massachusetts v. Hinds, 927 N.E.2d 1009 (Mass. 2010) — voluntary manslaughter; provocation requirement.
Noakes v. Virginia — IM via gross negligence (cardboard crib cover).
State v. Powell — IM via intentional violation of safety ordinance (loose dogs).
People v. McCoy — IM via gross negligence (speeding). ]]>outline/ch.-8—homicide/manslaughter/manslaughter.htmlOutline/Ch. 8—Homicide/Manslaughter/Manslaughter.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:43:36 GMTPeople v. Portillo. Causal connection between the felony and the act resulting in death. Merger doctrine: the underlying felony cannot be one that "merges" with the killing (e.g., assault), or felony murder would swallow most homicides.
CL Felony Murder: NO additional mens rea required beyond intent to commit the felony. See State v. Blair, 228 P.3d 564 (2010). MPC § 210.2: rebuttable presumption of extreme recklessness when homicide occurs during enumerated felonies. Cases:
State v. Blair, 228 P.3d 564 (2010) — no separate mental state needed for the killing itself.
People v. Portillo — felony continues until ∆ reaches a place of temporary safety. ]]>outline/ch.-8—homicide/murder/felony-murder/felony-murder.htmlOutline/Ch. 8—Homicide/Murder/Felony Murder/Felony Murder.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:43:25 GMToutline/ch.-8—homicide/murder/second-degree-murder/second-degree-murder.htmlOutline/Ch. 8—Homicide/Murder/Second Degree Murder/Second Degree Murder.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:43:13 GMTState v. Ramirez, 945 P.2d 376 (Ariz. 1997). Deliberation — ∆ acted with a cool mind capable of reflection.
Even momentary reflection may suffice. See State v. Davis, 905 S.W.2d 921 (1995). Actual reflection — Ramirez emphasizes that premeditation requires actual reflection, not just enough time during which ∆ might have reflected. Generally: rape, robbery, arson, burglary, kidnapping (varies by jurisdiction). Killings during these felonies are first-degree murder by statute. "Deliberation" = cool mind, capacity for reflection. "Premeditation" = ∆ in fact reflected, however briefly, before killing. Deadly-weapon rule: "intentional use of a deadly weapon authorizes a permissive inference of intent to kill." Cases:
State v. Hope, 137 N.E.3d 549 (Ohio 2019) — prior calculation and design factors.
State v. Ramirez, 945 P.2d 376 (Ariz. 1997) — premeditation = actual reflection.
State v. Davis, 905 S.W.2d 921 (1995) — momentary reflection sufficient. ]]>outline/ch.-8—homicide/murder/first-degree-murder/first-degree-murder.htmlOutline/Ch. 8—Homicide/Murder/First Degree Murder/First Degree Murder.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:43:06 GMTFirst Degree Murder — premeditated, deliberate, intentional; or certain enumerated felony murders.
Second Degree Murder — all other murders (e.g., intent-to-kill without P&D, intent to do GBI, depraved heart).
Felony Murder — death caused during the commission of (or immediate flight from) a qualifying felony. Purposeful or knowing killings. Killings with extreme recklessness (extreme indifference to value of human life). Felony murder = rebuttable presumption of extreme recklessness during enumerated felonies.
State v. Hope, 137 N.E.3d 549 (Ohio 2019) — aggravated murder; "prior calculation and design."
State v. Davis, 905 S.W.2d 921 (1995) — momentary deliberation may suffice.
State v. Ramirez, 945 P.2d 376 (Ariz. 1997) — premeditation = actual reflection.
Massachusetts v. Hinds, 927 N.E.2d 1009 (Mass. 2010) — provocation must come from victim. ]]>outline/ch.-8—homicide/murder/murder.htmlOutline/Ch. 8—Homicide/Murder/Murder.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:42:58 GMTlegal duty. Mens Rea — varies by offense: Intent to kill (with or without P&D), Intent to do serious bodily injury, Depraved heart (extreme recklessness), Intent to commit a felony (felony murder).
Causation — ∆'s conduct must legally cause the death of a living human victim. See Ch. 4—Causation. Year-and-a-Day Rule (minority jurisdictions): death must occur within a year and a day after the conduct that caused the fatal injury. Murder — purposeful/knowing, intent to do GBI, or depraved heart. Voluntary Manslaughter — intentional killing in heat of passion, with adequate provocation, before cooling time. Involuntary Manslaughter — recklessness or criminal negligence.
See Murder and Manslaughter.]]>outline/ch.-8—homicide/general-rule/general-rule.htmlOutline/Ch. 8—Homicide/General Rule/General Rule.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:42:51 GMTGeneral Rule
Murder
First Degree Murder
Second Degree Murder
Felony Murder
Manslaughter Voluntary Manslaughter Involuntary Manslaughter
State v. Hope, 137 N.E.3d 549 (Ohio 2019) — prior calculation and design.
State v. Davis, 905 S.W.2d 921 (1995) — momentary deliberation suffices.
Massachusetts v. Hinds, 927 N.E.2d 1009 (Mass. 2010) — provocation requirement.
State v. Ramirez, 945 P.2d 376 (Ariz. 1997) — premeditation = actual reflection.
State v. Burley — homicide / actus reus.
State v. Blair, 228 P.3d 564 (2010) — felony murder; mens rea derived from underlying felony.
People v. Portillo — felony murder; temporal scope.
Noakes v. Virginia — involuntary manslaughter; gross negligence.
State v. Powell — involuntary manslaughter; intentional violation of safety statute.
People v. McCoy — gross negligence in driving = involuntary manslaughter. Reading: pp. 375–84, 388–96, 406–09, 411–22, 423–27, 432–39.]]>outline/ch.-8—homicide/ch.-8—homicide.htmlOutline/Ch. 8—Homicide/Ch. 8—Homicide.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:42:45 GMTRenunciation or Withdrawal stops Pinkerton liability going forward. THEN ∆ is responsible for crimes of the co-conspirator. Pinkerton dramatically extends conspiracy liability—∆ may be convicted of crimes she neither committed nor knew about. It is the principal mechanism by which low-level participants are convicted of serious offenses (homicides during drug deals, etc.). ]]>outline/ch.-7—conspiracy/renunciation/pinkerton-rule.htmlOutline/Ch. 7—Conspiracy/Renunciation/Pinkerton Rule.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:42:15 GMToutline/ch.-7—conspiracy/renunciation/merger.htmlOutline/Ch. 7—Conspiracy/Renunciation/Merger.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:42:06 GMTRenunciation. Stops conspiracy liability going forward, but does not undo what is already done. ∆ is still guilty of conspiracy. ∆ is still guilty of crimes already committed by ∆ or co-conspirators before withdrawal. ∆ is not liable for future crimes by co-conspirators (Pinkerton liability cut off prospectively). Common Law: ∆ must take affirmative action to announce withdrawal to the other conspirators with enough time for them to abandon the conspiracy. Some jurisdictions require ∆ to thwart the conspiracy. MPC § 5.03(7)(c): ∆ must: Advise those with whom ∆ conspired of his abandonment, OR Inform law enforcement of the existence of the conspiracy and ∆'s participation. Renunciation = complete defense (MPC); requires thwarting + voluntariness + completeness. Withdrawal = partial; cuts off future liability only. ]]>outline/ch.-7—conspiracy/renunciation/withdrawal.htmlOutline/Ch. 7—Conspiracy/Renunciation/Withdrawal.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:42:02 GMTWithdrawal — weaker remedy than renunciation; cuts off prospective liability but does not undo conspiracy already formed.
Merger — does conspiracy merge into the completed offense?
Pinkerton Rule — co-conspirator liability for foreseeable crimes. ]]>outline/ch.-7—conspiracy/renunciation/renunciation.htmlOutline/Ch. 7—Conspiracy/Renunciation/Renunciation.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:41:55 GMTLegal Impossibility.]]>outline/ch.-7—conspiracy/legal-impossibility/state-v.-huff,-769-n.w.2d-154-(2009).htmlOutline/Ch. 7—Conspiracy/Legal Impossibility/State v. Huff, 769 N.W.2d 154 (2009).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:41:48 GMTState v. Mendoza, 889 A.2d 153 (2005) for the doctrine in action.]]>outline/ch.-7—conspiracy/legal-impossibility/wharton's-rule.htmlOutline/Ch. 7—Conspiracy/Legal Impossibility/Wharton's Rule.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:41:40 GMTWharton's Rule and the bilateral/unilateral analysis in Ch. 7—Conspiracy.Cases:
State v. Mendoza, 889 A.2d 153 (2005) — Wharton's Rule.
State v. Huff, 769 N.W.2d 154 (2009) — legal impossibility no defense in unilateral jurx. ]]>outline/ch.-7—conspiracy/legal-impossibility/legal-impossibility.htmlOutline/Ch. 7—Conspiracy/Legal Impossibility/Legal Impossibility.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:41:31 GMTOvert Act.]]>outline/ch.-7—conspiracy/overt-act/state-v.-garcia,-376-p.3d-94-(kan.-ct.-app.-2016).htmlOutline/Ch. 7—Conspiracy/Overt Act/State v. Garcia, 376 P.3d 94 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:41:26 GMTState v. Garcia, 376 P.3d 94 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016) — what evidence supports the overt-act requirement. ]]>outline/ch.-7—conspiracy/overt-act/overt-act.htmlOutline/Ch. 7—Conspiracy/Overt Act/Overt Act.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:41:19 GMTMens Rea.]]>outline/ch.-7—conspiracy/mens-rea/u.s.-v.-blankenship,-970-f.2d-283-(1992).htmlOutline/Ch. 7—Conspiracy/Mens Rea/U.S. v. Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283 (1992).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:41:14 GMTMens Rea.]]>outline/ch.-7—conspiracy/mens-rea/colorado-v.-palmer,-964-p.2d-524-(colo.-1998).htmlOutline/Ch. 7—Conspiracy/Mens Rea/Colorado v. Palmer, 964 P.2d 524 (Colo. 1998).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:41:04 GMTColorado v. Palmer, 964 P.2d 524 (Colo. 1998). Mere sellers and buyers are not automatically conspirators. Sellers may conspire with buyers if they share criminal purpose. Where does mere sale end and conspiracy begin? Direct evidence of agreement. A "stake in the venture": special interest in the criminal activity. No legitimate use for the product (or for that volume). Aggravated nature/severity of the criminal activity.
See U.S. v. Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283 (1992). Cases:
Colorado v. Palmer, 964 P.2d 524 (Colo. 1998)
U.S. v. Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283 (1992) ]]>outline/ch.-7—conspiracy/mens-rea/mens-rea.htmlOutline/Ch. 7—Conspiracy/Mens Rea/Mens Rea.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:40:59 GMTActus Reus.]]>outline/ch.-7—conspiracy/actus-reus/state-v.-rosado,-2009-wl-3086436-(conn.-2009).htmlOutline/Ch. 7—Conspiracy/Actus Reus/State v. Rosado, 2009 WL 3086436 (Conn. 2009).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:40:50 GMTActus Reus.]]>outline/ch.-7—conspiracy/actus-reus/state-v.-papillon,-236-a.3d-839-(n.h.-2020).htmlOutline/Ch. 7—Conspiracy/Actus Reus/State v. Papillon, 236 A.3d 839 (N.H. 2020).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:40:44 GMTState v. Rosado, 2009 WL 3086436 (Conn. 2009)): ∆ present at scene of crime. ∆ present when principal directed the act and provided weapons. ∆ fled with conspirators to a common location, where weapons were later found. DNA on weapons. False statements to police. → The closer ∆'s presence correlates to multiple points of the crime, the stronger the inference. Cases:
State v. Papillon, 236 A.3d 839 (N.H. 2020) — tacit understanding sufficient.
State v. Rosado, 2009 WL 3086436 (Conn. 2009) — circumstantial evidence sufficient.
How many conspiracies? — single agreement vs. multiple agreements. ]]>outline/ch.-7—conspiracy/actus-reus/actus-reus.htmlOutline/Ch. 7—Conspiracy/Actus Reus/Actus Reus.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:40:28 GMToutline/ch.-7—conspiracy/justifications-for-conspiracy.htmlOutline/Ch. 7—Conspiracy/Justifications for Conspiracy.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:40:21 GMTJustifications for Conspiracy — why we punish conspiracy.
Actus Reus — agreement; tacit/circumstantial agreement; "how many conspiracies?"
Mens Rea — intent to agree + intent to achieve; sellers/buyers.
Overt Act — what counts; need not be illegal.
Legal Impossibility — Wharton's Rule and unilateral/bilateral approaches.
Renunciation — withdrawal, merger, and the Pinkerton Rule. Bilateral (CL Majority): two or more persons must be in actual agreement. An undercover officer is not an actual conspirator; results in fewer conspiracy convictions. Unilateral (MPC / CL Minority): one person who is, or believes she is, agreeing with another. An undercover officer is enough to support conspiracy under this approach.
State v. Papillon, 236 A.3d 839 (N.H. 2020) — tacit agreement.
State v. Rosado, 2009 WL 3086436 (Conn. 2009) — circumstantial-evidence-only conspiracy.
Colorado v. Palmer, 964 P.2d 524 (Colo. 1998) — no conspiracy to commit reckless manslaughter.
U.S. v. Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283 (1992) — knowing assistance ≠ conspiracy.
State v. Garcia, 376 P.3d 94 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016) — overt act.
State v. Mendoza, 889 A.2d 153 (2005) — Wharton's Rule.
State v. Huff, 769 N.W.2d 154 (2009) — legal impossibility no defense in unilateral jurx.
Pinkerton v. United States — co-conspirator liability for foreseeable crimes (the Pinkerton Rule). Reading: pp. 299–311, 316–19, 329–39, 342–53, 355–65.]]>outline/ch.-7—conspiracy/ch.-7—conspiracy.htmlOutline/Ch. 7—Conspiracy/Ch. 7—Conspiracy.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:40:14 GMTWharton's Rule, does conspiracy lie when the object of the agreement is itself a crime that requires two participants (here, sale-and-delivery of drugs)? Rule: Wharton's Rule does not bar conspiracy when more than the minimum number of participants required by the target crime are involved. Analysis: Sale of drugs is a 2-person crime (seller + buyer)—a conspiracy between Mendoza and Clement to deliver to each other would be barred by WR. But here, Mendoza and Clement conspired to sell to A'Vant—a third party. Three participants make conspiracy distinct from the underlying offense. Judgment: Conviction affirmed.
Reading: pp. 350–53. See Wharton's Rule and Legal Impossibility.]]>outline/ch.-7—conspiracy/legal-impossibility/state-v.-mendoza,-889-a.2d-153-(2005).htmlOutline/Ch. 7—Conspiracy/Legal Impossibility/State v. Mendoza, 889 A.2d 153 (2005).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:38:54 GMTImpossibility.]]>outline/ch.-6—attempt/people-v.-dlugash,-363-n.e.2d-1155-(n.y.-app.-1977).htmlOutline/Ch. 6—Attempt/People v. Dlugash, 363 N.E.2d 1155 (N.Y. App. 1977).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:37:05 GMTState v. Guffey, 262 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. App. 1953). See Impossibility.]]>outline/ch.-6—attempt/state-v.-curtis,-603-a.2d-356-(vt.-1992).htmlOutline/Ch. 6—Attempt/State v. Curtis, 603 A.2d 356 (Vt. 1992).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:36:58 GMTState v. Curtis, 603 A.2d 356 (Vt. 1992) for the modern rejection. See Impossibility.]]>outline/ch.-6—attempt/state-v.-guffey,-262-s.w.2d-152-(mo.-app.-1953).htmlOutline/Ch. 6—Attempt/State v. Guffey, 262 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. App. 1953).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:36:52 GMTAbandonment and Ch. 6—Attempt.]]>outline/ch.-6—attempt/state-v.-workman,-584-p.2d-382-(wash.-en-banc-1978).htmlOutline/Ch. 6—Attempt/State v. Workman, 584 P.2d 382 (Wash. en banc 1978).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:36:45 GMTCh. 6—Attempt.]]>outline/ch.-6—attempt/u.s.-v.-jackson,-560-f.2d-112-(2d-cir.-1977).htmlOutline/Ch. 6—Attempt/U.S. v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1977).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:36:38 GMTCh. 6—Attempt.]]>outline/ch.-6—attempt/people-v.-rizzo,-158-n.e.-888-(n.y.-1927).htmlOutline/Ch. 6—Attempt/People v. Rizzo, 158 N.E. 888 (N.Y. 1927).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:36:31 GMTCh. 6—Attempt.]]>outline/ch.-6—attempt/commonwealth-v.-peaslee,-59-n.e.-55-(mass.-1901).htmlOutline/Ch. 6—Attempt/Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 59 N.E. 55 (Mass. 1901).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:36:24 GMTCh. 6—Attempt.]]>outline/ch.-6—attempt/people-v.-gibson,-210-p.2d-747-(cal.-app.-1949).htmlOutline/Ch. 6—Attempt/People v. Gibson, 210 P.2d 747 (Cal. App. 1949).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:36:19 GMTCh. 6—Attempt. (Note: in majority CL jurisdictions, attempt still requires specific intent—Maestas is the minority/code rule.)]]>outline/ch.-6—attempt/state-v.-maestas,-652-p.2d-903-(utah-1982).htmlOutline/Ch. 6—Attempt/State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah 1982).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:36:13 GMTState v. Guffey, 262 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. App. 1953) — old-school legal impossibility (decoy deer).
State v. Curtis, 603 A.2d 356 (Vt. 1992) — modern rejection of legal-impossibility defense (decoy deer redux).
People v. Dlugash, 363 N.E.2d 1155 (N.Y. App. 1977) — belief-based liability under MPC framework. ]]>outline/ch.-6—attempt/impossibility.htmlOutline/Ch. 6—Attempt/Impossibility.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:36:02 GMTState v. Workman, 584 P.2d 382 (Wash. en banc 1978) — once attempt complete, no abandonment. ]]>outline/ch.-6—attempt/abandonment.htmlOutline/Ch. 6—Attempt/Abandonment.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:35:51 GMTState v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah 1982).
Intent may be inferred from the circumstances—see People v. Gibson, 210 P.2d 747 (Cal. App. 1949). General Rule: attempt begins when preparation ends and perpetration begins. Proximity Tests (older / CL): Last Act: ∆ has done everything he intended, but the crime did not complete. Physical Proximity: was ∆'s act sufficiently proximate to the completed crime?
Dangerous Proximity: how serious is the social apprehension created? (See People v. Rizzo, 158 N.E. 888 (N.Y. 1927).) Indispensable Element: anything missing that is necessary to the crime? Substantial Step Tests (modern / MPC): Probable Desistance: would ∆ have completed the crime without interference? Abnormal Step: would a reasonable person have stopped before this point? Res ipsa loquitur: are we certain of ∆'s intent based on the acts? MPC § 5.01: ∆ must take a "substantial step" strongly corroborative of criminal purpose. Punishes attempts much earlier than CL approaches.
See Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 59 N.E. 55 (Mass. 1901) and U.S. v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1977).
Abandonment
Impossibility
State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah 1982) — mens rea standard.
People v. Gibson, 210 P.2d 747 (Cal. App. 1949) — intent inferred from circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 59 N.E. 55 (Mass. 1901) — actus reus; "very near."
People v. Rizzo, 158 N.E. 888 (N.Y. 1927) — dangerous proximity.
U.S. v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1977) — substantial step / last proximate act.
State v. Workman, 584 P.2d 382 (Wash. en banc 1978) — abandonment.
State v. Guffey, 262 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. App. 1953) — legal impossibility.
State v. Curtis, 603 A.2d 356 (Vt. 1992) — modern attempt; impossibility rejected.
People v. Dlugash, 363 N.E.2d 1155 (N.Y. App. 1977) — factual impossibility & belief. Reading: pp. 257–60, 262–67, 269–75, 278–80, 284–91.]]>outline/ch.-6—attempt/ch.-6—attempt.htmlOutline/Ch. 6—Attempt/Ch. 6—Attempt.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:35:45 GMTAfter the Fact.]]>outline/ch.-5—accomplice-liability/accessories/in-the-second-degree.htmlOutline/Ch. 5—Accomplice Liability/Accessories/In the Second Degree.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:35:19 GMTBefore the Fact.]]>outline/ch.-5—accomplice-liability/accessories/in-the-first-degree.htmlOutline/Ch. 5—Accomplice Liability/Accessories/In the First Degree.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:35:18 GMToutline/ch.-5—accomplice-liability/accessories/after-the-fact.htmlOutline/Ch. 5—Accomplice Liability/Accessories/After the Fact.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:34:57 GMToutline/ch.-5—accomplice-liability/accessories/before-the-fact.htmlOutline/Ch. 5—Accomplice Liability/Accessories/Before the Fact.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:34:53 GMTBefore the Fact — intentionally assists or encourages the crime before it happens; treated as an accomplice.
After the Fact — helps cover up the crime; not an accomplice. Distinct crime (e.g., obstruction of justice, harboring); no merger with the underlying offense.
Cf. Principals (who are present at the act).]]>outline/ch.-5—accomplice-liability/accessories/accessories.htmlOutline/Ch. 5—Accomplice Liability/Accessories/Accessories.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:34:50 GMToutline/ch.-5—accomplice-liability/principals/in-the-second-degree.htmlOutline/Ch. 5—Accomplice Liability/Principals/In the Second Degree.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:34:47 GMTprincipal in the second degree (who is present and aids) and from Accessories (who are not present). ]]>outline/ch.-5—accomplice-liability/principals/in-the-first-degree.htmlOutline/Ch. 5—Accomplice Liability/Principals/In the First Degree.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:34:43 GMTIn the First Degree — actually does the act.
In the Second Degree — intentionally assists in and is present for the crime; treated as an accomplice.
Cf. Accessories (assist before/after, not present at commission).]]>outline/ch.-5—accomplice-liability/principals/principals.htmlOutline/Ch. 5—Accomplice Liability/Principals/Principals.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:34:41 GMTCh. 5—Accomplice Liability.]]>outline/ch.-5—accomplice-liability/twitter,-inc.-v.-taamneh,-143-s.ct.-1206-(2023).htmlOutline/Ch. 5—Accomplice Liability/Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 143 S.Ct. 1206 (2023).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:34:39 GMTCh. 5—Accomplice Liability.]]>outline/ch.-5—accomplice-liability/new-hampshire-v.-merritt,-738-a.2d-343-(n.h.-1999).htmlOutline/Ch. 5—Accomplice Liability/New Hampshire v. Merritt, 738 A.2d 343 (N.H. 1999).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:34:31 GMTNew Hampshire v. Merritt, 738 A.2d 343 (N.H. 1999)). Mens Rea (Common Law) Intent to assist or encourage the principal, Intent that the principal actually commit the crime, AND The mens rea required of the underlying offense. Attendant Circumstances The crime intended must actually occur (or be attempted, where attempt liability attaches).
Knowing assistance ≠ purposeful assistance: see Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 143 S.Ct. 1206 (2023)—platform's general awareness that bad actors used its services was insufficient.
Principals
In the First Degree — actually performs the actus reus.
In the Second Degree — intentionally assists and is present; treated as accomplice.
Accessories
Before the Fact — intentionally assists/encourages, not present; treated as accomplice.
After the Fact — helps cover up; not an accomplice—distinct crime, no merger.
New Hampshire v. Merritt, 738 A.2d 343 (N.H. 1999) — actus reus; presence as encouragement.
Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 143 S.Ct. 1206 (2023) — knowing vs. purposeful; conscious culpable participation. Standefer v. United States — accomplice may be convicted even where principal acquitted (pp. 213–16). People v. Soares — purpose to promote/facilitate (pp. 213–16). People v. Kaplan — natural and probable consequences doctrine (pp. 216–19). State v. Potts — limits on accomplice liability for unintended results (pp. 221–23). Reading: pp. 193–95, 204–05 (MPC), 208–10, 213–37.]]>outline/ch.-5—accomplice-liability/ch.-5—accomplice-liability.htmlOutline/Ch. 5—Accomplice Liability/Ch. 5—Accomplice Liability.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:34:24 GMTCh. 4—Causation.]]>outline/ch.-4—causation/state-v.-mcgee.htmlOutline/Ch. 4—Causation/State v. McGee.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:34:06 GMTCh. 4—Causation.]]>outline/ch.-4—causation/people-v.-acosta,-284-cal.-rptr.-117-(cal.-ct.-app.-1991).htmlOutline/Ch. 4—Causation/People v. Acosta, 284 Cal. Rptr. 117 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:34:01 GMTCh. 4—Causation.]]>outline/ch.-4—causation/stephenson-v.-state,-179-n.e.-633-(ind.-1932).htmlOutline/Ch. 4—Causation/Stephenson v. State, 179 N.E. 633 (Ind. 1932).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:33:55 GMTProximate Cause.]]>outline/ch.-4—causation/actual-cause.htmlOutline/Ch. 4—Causation/Actual Cause.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:33:30 GMTMistake of Law.]]>outline/ch.-3—mens-rea/u.s.-v.-scarmazzo,-554-f.-supp.-2d-1102-(e.d.cal.-2008).htmlOutline/Ch. 3—Mens Rea/U.S. v. Scarmazzo, 554 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (E.D.Cal. 2008).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:33:01 GMTStrict Liability Crimes.]]>outline/ch.-3—mens-rea/north-carolina-v.-breathette,-690-s.e.2d-1-(n.c.-2010).htmlOutline/Ch. 3—Mens Rea/North Carolina v. Breathette, 690 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 2010).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:32:55 GMTIntoxicated or Drugged Condition.]]>outline/ch.-3—mens-rea/kipp-v.-delaware,-704-a.2d-839-(del.-1998).htmlOutline/Ch. 3—Mens Rea/Kipp v. Delaware, 704 A.2d 839 (Del. 1998).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:32:51 GMTIntoxicated or Drugged Condition.]]>outline/ch.-3—mens-rea/hawaii-v.-decastro,-913-p.2d-558-(ha.-ct.-app.-1996).htmlOutline/Ch. 3—Mens Rea/Hawaii v. DeCastro, 913 P.2d 558 (Ha. Ct. App. 1996).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:32:46 GMTStrict Liability Crimes.]]>outline/ch.-3—mens-rea/strict-liability-crimes/rehaif-v.-united-states,-139-s.-ct.-2191-(2019).htmlOutline/Ch. 3—Mens Rea/Strict Liability Crimes/Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:32:41 GMTHopson v. Texas, 2009 WL 1124389 (Tex. App.-Hous. (14 Dist.) 2009)). Cases here:
Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) — presumption against strict liability where statute uses "knowingly." ]]>outline/ch.-3—mens-rea/strict-liability-crimes/strict-liability-crimes.htmlOutline/Ch. 3—Mens Rea/Strict Liability Crimes/Strict Liability Crimes.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:32:34 GMTMistake of Fact — different rules apply.]]>outline/ch.-3—mens-rea/mistake-of-law/mistake-of-law.htmlOutline/Ch. 3—Mens Rea/Mistake of Law/Mistake of Law.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:32:25 GMTMistake of Fact.]]>outline/ch.-3—mens-rea/mistake-of-fact/iowa-v.-freeman,-450-n.w.2d-826-(iowa-1990).htmlOutline/Ch. 3—Mens Rea/Mistake of Fact/Iowa v. Freeman, 450 N.W.2d 826 (Iowa 1990).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:32:19 GMTMistake of Fact.]]>outline/ch.-3—mens-rea/mistake-of-fact/hopson-v.-texas,-2009-wl-1124389-(tex.-app.-hous.-(14-dist.)-2009).htmlOutline/Ch. 3—Mens Rea/Mistake of Fact/Hopson v. Texas, 2009 WL 1124389 (Tex. App.-Hous. (14 Dist.) 2009).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:32:14 GMTHopson v. Texas, 2009 WL 1124389 (Tex. App.-Hous. (14 Dist.) 2009)
Iowa v. Freeman, 450 N.W.2d 826 (Iowa 1990) ]]>outline/ch.-3—mens-rea/mistake-of-fact/mistake-of-fact.htmlOutline/Ch. 3—Mens Rea/Mistake of Fact/Mistake of Fact.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:32:09 GMTCh. 1—Purposes of Criminal Law.]]>outline/ch.-1—purposes-of-criminal-law/u.s.-v.-bergman,-416-f.supp.-496-(s.d.n.y.-1976).htmlOutline/Ch. 1—Purposes of Criminal Law/U.S. v. Bergman, 416 F.Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:31:36 GMToutline/ch.-3—mens-rea/mens-rea-generally/state-v.-ducker,-1999-wl-160981-(tenn.-crim.-app.-1999).htmlOutline/Ch. 3—Mens Rea/Mens Rea Generally/State v. Ducker, 1999 WL 160981 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:19:31 GMToutline/ch.-3—mens-rea/mens-rea-generally/regina-v.-faulkner,-13-cox-crim.-cas.-550-(1877).htmlOutline/Ch. 3—Mens Rea/Mens Rea Generally/Regina v. Faulkner, 13 Cox Crim. Cas. 550 (1877).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:17:54 GMTMens Rea Generally
Intoxicated or Drugged Condition
Mistake of Fact
Mistake of Law ]]>outline/ch.-3—mens-rea/ch.-3—mens-rea.htmlOutline/Ch. 3—Mens Rea/Ch. 3—Mens Rea.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:16:04 GMTPeople v. Atkins, 18 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2001). Involuntary: can serves as a complete defense for mens rea. Exs: getting drugged, not knowing that there was an intoxicating substance you were exposed to, etc. Model Penal Code § 2.08—Intoxication Intoxication is not a defense unless it negates an element of an offense See above for voluntary v. involuntary intoxication. ]]>outline/ch.-3—mens-rea/intoxicated-or-drugged-condition/intoxicated-or-drugged-condition.htmlOutline/Ch. 3—Mens Rea/Intoxicated or Drugged Condition/Intoxicated or Drugged Condition.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:13:37 GMToutline/ch.-3—mens-rea/intoxicated-or-drugged-condition/people-v.-atkins,-18-p.3d-660-(cal.-2001).htmlOutline/Ch. 3—Mens Rea/Intoxicated or Drugged Condition/People v. Atkins, 18 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2001).mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:11:59 GMToutline/ch.-3—mens-rea/mens-rea-generally/mens-rea-generally.htmlOutline/Ch. 3—Mens Rea/Mens Rea Generally/Mens Rea Generally.mdThu, 07 May 2026 19:08:15 GMTvoluntary "act" or "omission" when an appropriate duty to act exists. If the alleged act was involuntary, there may be no justification for imposing punishment.  Some crimes (e.g., murder) are “result” crimes in that a conviction requires proof that defendant “caused” a particular result (with the required mens rea). Other crimes are “conduct” crimes in that conviction requires proof that defendant engaged in prohibited conduct with the required mens rea. In most instances, there must be “concurrence” between the actus reus and the mens rea when defendant engages in the conduct (as well as when defendant causes a particular result).
Basic Decision Tree: Actus Reus Decision Tree.canvas
]]>outline/ch.-2—actus-reus/ch.-2—actus-reus.htmlOutline/Ch. 2—Actus Reus/Ch. 2—Actus Reus.mdThu, 07 May 2026 18:38:31 GMT<figure><img src="."></figure>]]>outline/ch.-2—actus-reus/actus-reus-decision-tree.htmlOutline/Ch. 2—Actus Reus/Actus Reus Decision Tree.pngThu, 07 May 2026 18:38:09 GMT<figure><img src="."></figure>outline/ch.-2—actus-reus/actus-reus-decision-tree.htmlOutline/Ch. 2—Actus Reus/Actus Reus Decision Tree.canvasThu, 07 May 2026 18:36:43 GMToutline/ch.-2—actus-reus/omission-upon-legal-duty/state-v.-williquette,-385-n.w.2d-145-(1986).htmlOutline/Ch. 2—Actus Reus/Omission Upon Legal Duty/State v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145 (1986).mdThu, 07 May 2026 18:23:32 GMTState v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145 (1986). one has assumed a contractual duty to care for another; or Ex: Nursing home nurse to a resident.
See Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1962). one has voluntarily taken over/assumed care of another and so secluded the help person as to prevent others from rendering aid.
See Commonwealth v. Pestinikas, 617 A.2d 1339 (1992). A moral duty to act is insufficient to create a legal duty to act. On parent/child or child/parent duties: Parent generally has a duty to care for their child Child generally does NOT have a duty to care for their parent ]]>outline/ch.-2—actus-reus/omission-upon-legal-duty/omission-upon-legal-duty.htmlOutline/Ch. 2—Actus Reus/Omission Upon Legal Duty/Omission Upon Legal Duty.mdThu, 07 May 2026 18:23:07 GMToutline/ch.-2—actus-reus/omission-upon-legal-duty/commonwealth-v.-pestinikas,-617-a.2d-1339-(1992).htmlOutline/Ch. 2—Actus Reus/Omission Upon Legal Duty/Commonwealth v. Pestinikas, 617 A.2d 1339 (1992).mdThu, 07 May 2026 18:22:30 GMToutline/ch.-2—actus-reus/omission-upon-legal-duty/jones-v.-united-states,-308-f.2d-307-(d.c.-cir.-1962).htmlOutline/Ch. 2—Actus Reus/Omission Upon Legal Duty/Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1962).mdThu, 07 May 2026 18:20:46 GMToutline/ch.-2—actus-reus/voluntary-act/possession-as-actus-reus.htmlOutline/Ch. 2—Actus Reus/Voluntary Act/Possession as Actus Reus.mdThu, 07 May 2026 18:04:27 GMTInvoluntary by External Force
Involuntary by Internal Force
Possession
Status/Condition as Actus Reus ]]>outline/ch.-2—actus-reus/voluntary-act/voluntary-act.htmlOutline/Ch. 2—Actus Reus/Voluntary Act/Voluntary Act.mdThu, 07 May 2026 18:03:46 GMToutline/ch.-2—actus-reus/voluntary-act/involuntary-act-by-internal-force.htmlOutline/Ch. 2—Actus Reus/Voluntary Act/Involuntary Act by Internal Force.mdThu, 07 May 2026 18:02:57 GMToutline/ch.-2—actus-reus/voluntary-act/involuntary-act-by-external-force.htmlOutline/Ch. 2—Actus Reus/Voluntary Act/Involuntary Act by External Force.mdThu, 07 May 2026 17:59:52 GMToutline/ch.-2—actus-reus/voluntary-act/status-or-condition-as-actus-reus.htmlOutline/Ch. 2—Actus Reus/Voluntary Act/Status or Condition as Actus Reus.mdThu, 07 May 2026 17:58:57 GMToutline/ch.-1—purposes-of-criminal-law/regina-v.-dudley-&-stephens,-14-q.b.d.-273-[1884].htmlOutline/Ch. 1—Purposes of Criminal Law/Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 [1884].mdWed, 06 May 2026 15:57:44 GMToutline/ch.-1—purposes-of-criminal-law/ch.-1—purposes-of-criminal-law.htmlOutline/Ch. 1—Purposes of Criminal Law/Ch. 1—Purposes of Criminal Law.mdWed, 06 May 2026 15:57:37 GMT