Ch. 7—Conspiracy

Conspiracy: an inchoate offense punishing the agreement to commit a crime, plus (in most jurisdictions) an overt act in furtherance.

Required Elements

Actus Reus: agreement to commit a crime.
Mens Rea:
- Intent to agree, AND
- Intent to achieve the criminal objective.
Overt Act in furtherance of the conspiracy (in most jurisdictions).

Justifications for Conspiracy — why we punish conspiracy.
Actus Reus — agreement; tacit/circumstantial agreement; "how many conspiracies?"
Mens Rea — intent to agree + intent to achieve; sellers/buyers.
Overt Act — what counts; need not be illegal.
Legal Impossibility — Wharton's Rule and unilateral/bilateral approaches.
Renunciation — withdrawal, merger, and the Pinkerton Rule.

Bilateral (CL Majority): two or more persons must be in actual agreement.
- An undercover officer is not an actual conspirator; results in fewer conspiracy convictions.
Unilateral (MPC / CL Minority): one person who is, or believes she is, agreeing with another.
- An undercover officer is enough to support conspiracy under this approach.

State v. Papillon, 236 A.3d 839 (N.H. 2020) — tacit agreement.
State v. Rosado, 2009 WL 3086436 (Conn. 2009) — circumstantial-evidence-only conspiracy.
Colorado v. Palmer, 964 P.2d 524 (Colo. 1998) — no conspiracy to commit reckless manslaughter.
U.S. v. Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283 (1992) — knowing assistance ≠ conspiracy.
State v. Garcia, 376 P.3d 94 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016) — overt act.
State v. Mendoza, 889 A.2d 153 (2005) — Wharton's Rule.
State v. Huff, 769 N.W.2d 154 (2009) — legal impossibility no defense in unilateral jurx.
Pinkerton v. United States — co-conspirator liability for foreseeable crimes (the Pinkerton Rule).

Reading: pp. 299–311, 316–19, 329–39, 342–53, 355–65.