http://github.com/dylang/node-rsssite-lib/media/favicon.pngWebpage HTML Export plugin for ObsidianMon, 04 May 2026 19:43:46 GMTMon, 04 May 2026 19:43:12 GMT60Washington v. Davis (1976) — established the framework. The Court will not strike down a racially neutral action just because it affects one class more than another. Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant; it can be used to prove discriminatory purpose (see Yick Wo). This analysis is limited to EPC violations. Congress can allow discriminatory impact alone to demonstrate discrimination by statute (e.g., Title VII, ADEA, ADA).
McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) — application to judicial discretion; statistics alone insufficient.
City of Mobile v. Bolden (1980) — application to elections; discriminatory impact alone does not suffice. Rogers v. Lodge (1982): at-large election systems can be unconstitutional with adequate proof of discriminatory purpose.
Palmer v. Thompson (1971) — even a discriminatory purpose without disparate impact generally does not violate the EPC (very rare scenario).
Distinguished from Loving v. Virginia: Loving's statute was facially discriminatory; Palmer's closure was not.
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney (1979) — foreseeable discriminatory effect ≠ discriminatory purpose. Discriminatory purpose = acting "because of" a discriminatory purpose; not merely "in spite of" a discriminatory effect.
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (1977) — discrimination need not be the sole reason; must be a motivating factor. Disproportionate impact — whether the action bears more heavily on specific classes (rarely sufficient on its own). Historical background — series of official actions taken for invidious purposes. Specific sequence of events — events leading up to the decision. Procedural or substantive departures — deviation from normal procedures. Legislative or administrative history — contemporary statements, minutes, reports. Challenger must prove discrimination was a motivating factor. State actor must prove it would have acted anyway, even without the discriminatory motive. If the state actor persuades the Court it would have acted anyway, the inquiry is over and rational basis applies. If not, the challenger has proven the discriminatory element; if there is also discriminatory impact (likely), apply the appropriate heightened level of scrutiny. Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) — facially neutral ordinance denied 199/200 petitions of Chinese laundromat owners; only rational conclusion was discriminatory purpose. The "res ipsa loquitur" of EPC analysis. Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960) — Tuskegee redrew its boundaries to surgically exclude 395 of 400 Black residents; struck down under the 15A. ]]>equal-protection/discriminatory-purpose-vs.-effect-(pp.-657–676)/discriminatory-purpose-vs.-effect-(pp.-657–676).htmlEqual Protection/Discriminatory Purpose vs. Effect (pp. 657–676)/Discriminatory Purpose vs. Effect (pp. 657–676).mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTWashington v. Davis framework to judicial discretion. Statistical evidence of system-wide disparity, no matter how stark, does not by itself establish individual purposeful discrimination. ]]>equal-protection/discriminatory-purpose-vs.-effect-(pp.-657–676)/mccleskey-v.-kemp.htmlEqual Protection/Discriminatory Purpose vs. Effect (pp. 657–676)/McCleskey v. Kemp.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTWashington v. Davis purpose test: even certain discriminatory effect is not enough. If a heightened level of scrutiny is not triggered, the state action must still withstand the rational basis standard. ]]>equal-protection/discriminatory-purpose-vs.-effect-(pp.-657–676)/personnel-administrator-of-massachusetts-v.-feeney.htmlEqual Protection/Discriminatory Purpose vs. Effect (pp. 657–676)/Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTequal-protection/discriminatory-purpose-vs.-effect-(pp.-657–676)/washington-v.-davis.htmlEqual Protection/Discriminatory Purpose vs. Effect (pp. 657–676)/Washington v. Davis.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTWashington v. Davis purpose requirement to elections. See also Rogers v. Lodge (1982): at-large election systems can be unconstitutional, but only on adequate proof of discriminatory purpose; discriminatory result alone does not suffice. ]]>equal-protection/discriminatory-purpose-vs.-effect-(pp.-657–676)/city-of-mobile-v.-bolden.htmlEqual Protection/Discriminatory Purpose vs. Effect (pp. 657–676)/City of Mobile v. Bolden.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTWashington v. Davis framework. ]]>equal-protection/discriminatory-purpose-vs.-effect-(pp.-657–676)/village-of-arlington-heights-v.-metropolitan-housing-development-corp..htmlEqual Protection/Discriminatory Purpose vs. Effect (pp. 657–676)/Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp..mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTLoving v. Virginia: Both involved government action motivated by racial animus that technically affected all races the same. The difference was that the statute in Loving was facially discriminatory, whereas there was no facially discriminatory statute or action in Palmer. There was also a standing/injury issue in Palmer: neither side suffered a legally cognizable injury because everyone was denied public pools. Illustrates the rare case where only discriminatory purpose is proven. ]]>equal-protection/discriminatory-purpose-vs.-effect-(pp.-657–676)/palmer-v.-thompson.htmlEqual Protection/Discriminatory Purpose vs. Effect (pp. 657–676)/Palmer v. Thompson.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTRomer v. Evans and USDA v. Moreno as a leading rational-basis-with-bite case. ]]>equal-protection/rational-basis-(pp.-609–634)/city-of-cleburne-v.-cleburne-living-center.htmlEqual Protection/Rational Basis (pp. 609–634)/City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTequal-protection/rational-basis-(pp.-609–634)/railway-express-agency-v.-new-york.htmlEqual Protection/Rational Basis (pp. 609–634)/Railway Express Agency v. New York.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTequal-protection/rational-basis-(pp.-609–634)/romer-v.-evans.htmlEqual Protection/Rational Basis (pp. 609–634)/Romer v. Evans.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTequal-protection/rational-basis-(pp.-609–634)/nyc-transit-authority-v.-beazer.htmlEqual Protection/Rational Basis (pp. 609–634)/NYC Transit Authority v. Beazer.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTRomer v. Evans. If so, is the action rationally related to achieving it?
Underinclusive laws (failing to regulate all similarly situated people) → generally allowed under rational basis. See Railway Express Agency v. New York.
Overinclusive laws (regulating more people than necessary) → generally allowed. See NYC Transit Authority v. Beazer.
Laws that are both under- and overinclusive → generally allowed. See Beazer. Trigger: When a law discriminates against a specific, traditionally unpopular group of people—but not those entitled to strict (race) or intermediate (sex) scrutiny—the Court will use an "elevated" version of rational basis colloquially referred to as rational basis "with bite." E.g., homosexuals, transgender persons, hippies, etc. Standard: there must be a heightened showing of legitimate governmental interest. The Court looks much closer at the government's actual motive and will refuse to accept a flimsy or hypothetical justification. A bare congressional or State desire to harm or discriminate against a politically unpopular group is not a legitimate government interest. A government action will generally fail under RBWB if the Court determines it was motivated by animus (hostility, prejudice, or irrational fear)—the Court is actively looking for evidence of this animus. Courts may use under-inclusiveness as evidence of animus under RBWB.
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.
Romer v. Evans — animus against politically vulnerable group not legitimate; RBWB.
Railway Express Agency v. New York — underinclusiveness allowed.
NYC Transit Authority v. Beazer — over- and underinclusiveness both allowed.
USDA v. Moreno — animus against hippies; RBWB.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center — irrational prejudice; RBWB. ]]>equal-protection/rational-basis-(pp.-609–634)/rational-basis-(pp.-609–634).htmlEqual Protection/Rational Basis (pp. 609–634)/Rational Basis (pp. 609–634).mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTequal-protection/rational-basis-(pp.-609–634)/usda-v.-moreno.htmlEqual Protection/Rational Basis (pp. 609–634)/USDA v. Moreno.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTOrr v. Orr (1979) — state actions that benefit women but have the purpose of reinforcing gender stereotypes will not withstand intermediate scrutiny. Invalid government objective: reinforcing traditional family roles (wives fully dependent on their husbands). Valid government objectives related to marriage: Providing financial assistance to needy spouses; and Compensating women for past economic discrimination during marriage.
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982) — review under intermediate scrutiny requires an "exceedingly persuasive justification." The members of the gender benefited by the classification must actually suffer a disadvantage in the specific area the statute regulates. Start with what's being regulated, then determine if the benefitted class was harmed in the past. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld (1975) — SS provisions allowing only widowed mothers to receive survivor benefits unconstitutional; based on stereotypes that only male earnings are vital. Takeaway: any law that reinforces gender stereotypes will likely be struck down under intermediate scrutiny. State action that classifies based on sex may be allowed if the sexes are not similarly situated with regard to the area being regulated. Generally, this concerns biological differences (pregnancy and birth).
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County (1981) — sex-specific statutory rape law upheld; women face natural deterrent (pregnancy) so the additional deterrent on men was permissible.
Rostker v. Goldberg (1981) — male-only draft registration upheld; women were excluded from combat at the time, so the classes were not similarly situated regarding combat-readiness. Modern implications: women now serve in combat, so the classes are technically now similarly situated. SCOTUS declined to reconsider in 2021.
Nguyen v. INS (2001) — citizenship for children born abroad; men and women not similarly situated regarding the birth of children. Gender classifications may withstand intermediate scrutiny if designed pursuant to biological differences. Opposite outcome — Sessions v. Morales-Santana (2017): physical-presence durational requirements (1 year for mothers, 5 years for fathers) lacked any inherent biological-difference justification; classification unconstitutional. A gender classification can withstand intermediate scrutiny if it directly compensates the benefited class for past economic or social discrimination. Need a direct and concrete link between the gender class benefiting and the historical discrimination claimed to be remedied.
Califano v. Webster (1977) — SS benefit formula granting women higher monthly payments upheld as redress for women's longstanding economic discrimination.
Reconciled with MUW v. Hogan: in MUW, the gender class benefitting from the regulated area (women in nursing) had never experienced discrimination in nursing — so no remedial measure was needed. In Webster, the policy applies to all women, who have historically suffered economic discrimination. Schlesinger v. Ballard (1975) — Navy discharged men after 9 years without promotion vs. women after 13 years; allowed because designed to remedy fewer opportunities for women to advance.
Califano v. Webster
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan
Nguyen v. INS
Orr v. Orr
Rostker v. Goldberg ]]>equal-protection/sex-discrimination-(pp.-737–772)/gender-stereotypes-and-distinctions-(pp.-752–772)/gender-stereotypes-and-distinctions-(pp.-752–772).htmlEqual Protection/Sex Discrimination (pp. 737–772)/Gender Stereotypes and Distinctions (pp. 752–772)/Gender Stereotypes and Distinctions (pp. 752–772).mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTequal-protection/sex-discrimination-(pp.-737–772)/gender-stereotypes-and-distinctions-(pp.-752–772)/orr-v.-orr.htmlEqual Protection/Sex Discrimination (pp. 737–772)/Gender Stereotypes and Distinctions (pp. 752–772)/Orr v. Orr.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTMississippi University for Women v. Hogan: The gender class benefitting from the area the law regulated in MUW (women in nursing) had never experienced discrimination — so there was no need for a remedial measure. In Webster, the SS policy applies to all women, who have historically suffered economic discrimination. See also Schlesinger v. Ballard (1975) — Navy discharged men after 9 years without promotion but women after 13 years; allowed because designed to remedy women's fewer opportunities to advance. Reminder: This deals with the EPC of the 5th Amendment because the federal government is involved. ]]>equal-protection/sex-discrimination-(pp.-737–772)/gender-stereotypes-and-distinctions-(pp.-752–772)/califano-v.-webster.htmlEqual Protection/Sex Discrimination (pp. 737–772)/Gender Stereotypes and Distinctions (pp. 752–772)/Califano v. Webster.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTCalifano v. Webster: the gender class benefitting from MUW's law had never experienced discrimination in nursing, so there was no need for a remedial measure. In Webster, the SS policy applied to all women, who have historically suffered economic discrimination. See also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld (1975) (SS provisions allowing only widowed mothers to claim survivor benefits unconstitutional, based on stereotypes that only male earnings are vital). Takeaway: any law that reinforces gender stereotypes will likely be struck down under intermediate scrutiny. ]]>equal-protection/sex-discrimination-(pp.-737–772)/gender-stereotypes-and-distinctions-(pp.-752–772)/mississippi-university-for-women-v.-hogan.htmlEqual Protection/Sex Discrimination (pp. 737–772)/Gender Stereotypes and Distinctions (pp. 752–772)/Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTMichael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County: the "not similarly situated" justification for sex classifications. Modern implications: Women now serve in combat roles, so the classes are technically now similarly situated; however, SCOTUS declined to reconsider in 2021. ]]>equal-protection/sex-discrimination-(pp.-737–772)/gender-stereotypes-and-distinctions-(pp.-752–772)/rostker-v.-goldberg.htmlEqual Protection/Sex Discrimination (pp. 737–772)/Gender Stereotypes and Distinctions (pp. 752–772)/Rostker v. Goldberg.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTRostker v. Goldberg.
Compare with Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (no biological-difference justification — sex classification struck down).
Compare with Nguyen v. INS (biological difference between mother and father at the moment of birth justified differential citizenship requirements). ]]>equal-protection/sex-discrimination-(pp.-737–772)/gender-stereotypes-and-distinctions-(pp.-752–772)/michael-m.-v.-superior-court-of-sonoma-county.htmlEqual Protection/Sex Discrimination (pp. 737–772)/Gender Stereotypes and Distinctions (pp. 752–772)/Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTMichael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County and Rostker v. Goldberg in the "not similarly situated due to biological differences" line of cases. Opposite outcome — Sessions v. Morales-Santana (2017): statute had the purpose of ensuring parents absorbed "American values" they could pass onto their kids before being able to transfer citizenship; women had to be in U.S. for 1 year, men for 5 years. Unlike Nguyen, there was no inherent biological difference supporting the gender classification for the established purpose. Classification unconstitutional. ]]>equal-protection/sex-discrimination-(pp.-737–772)/gender-stereotypes-and-distinctions-(pp.-752–772)/nguyen-v.-ins.htmlEqual Protection/Sex Discrimination (pp. 737–772)/Gender Stereotypes and Distinctions (pp. 752–772)/Nguyen v. INS.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTDobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization. ]]>equal-protection/sex-discrimination-(pp.-737–772)/level-of-scrutiny-(pp.-737–752)/geduldig-v.-aiello.htmlEqual Protection/Sex Discrimination (pp. 737–772)/Level of Scrutiny (pp. 737–752)/Geduldig v. Aiello.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTFrontiero v. Richardson (1973) — a plurality of the Court applied strict scrutiny to sex classification; "sex, much like race, is an immutable characteristic, and classifications based on sex are inherently suspect."
Craig v. Boren (1976) — the birth of intermediate scrutiny. State action that classifies on the basis of sex must: Serve an important governmental objective; and Be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.
United States v. Virginia (1996) — the state actor must show an "exceedingly persuasive justification." Evidence of an important governmental objective must be the actual purpose, not a post-hoc realization. Denying equal opportunity based on broad generalizations or sex stereotypes will not withstand intermediate scrutiny. Alternative remedial measures must be: A close fit to the constitutional violation; and Place the victims of discrimination in the position they would have been in absent the discrimination. Review the action to ensure sex is truly the classification being made.
Geduldig v. Aiello (1974) — pregnancy classifications are not necessarily sex classifications. OLD LAW (statutorily): Congress overruled Geduldig in employment with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.
Geduldig is still applied in other contexts to conclude that pregnancy/abortion regulation is not gender discrimination — see Dobbs.
Frontiero v. Richardson
Craig v. Boren
Geduldig v. Aiello
United States v. Virginia ]]>equal-protection/sex-discrimination-(pp.-737–772)/level-of-scrutiny-(pp.-737–752)/level-of-scrutiny-(pp.-737–752).htmlEqual Protection/Sex Discrimination (pp. 737–772)/Level of Scrutiny (pp. 737–752)/Level of Scrutiny (pp. 737–752).mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTMississippi University for Women v. Hogan. Drop the VMI buzzword as Step 2 of the intermediate-scrutiny analysis framework. ]]>equal-protection/sex-discrimination-(pp.-737–772)/level-of-scrutiny-(pp.-737–752)/united-states-v.-virginia.htmlEqual Protection/Sex Discrimination (pp. 737–772)/Level of Scrutiny (pp. 737–752)/United States v. Virginia.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTequal-protection/sex-discrimination-(pp.-737–772)/level-of-scrutiny-(pp.-737–752)/craig-v.-boren.htmlEqual Protection/Sex Discrimination (pp. 737–772)/Level of Scrutiny (pp. 737–752)/Craig v. Boren.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTCraig v. Boren with intermediate scrutiny. Reminder: This case involves the EPC of the Fifth Amendment because the federal government is the state actor (the 14th Amendment only applies to States and state actors). See also Reed v. Reed (1971) — the first case striking down gender discrimination, decided under rational basis. ]]>equal-protection/sex-discrimination-(pp.-737–772)/level-of-scrutiny-(pp.-737–752)/frontiero-v.-richardson.htmlEqual Protection/Sex Discrimination (pp. 737–772)/Level of Scrutiny (pp. 737–752)/Frontiero v. Richardson.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTPlessy v. Ferguson in the public-education context. ]]>equal-protection/race-and-national-origin-(pp.-634–657)/school-desegregation-(pp.-634–657)/brown-v.-board-of-education.htmlEqual Protection/Race and National Origin (pp. 634–657)/School Desegregation (pp. 634–657)/Brown v. Board of Education.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTBrown v. Board of Education (1954) — the bedrock of strict scrutiny. Notably, the Court did not explicitly apply strict scrutiny in Brown—it's universally understood that strict scrutiny would apply under modern standards. Any modern constitutional stance or analysis that would implicitly invalidate Brown is wholly baseless.
Effectively overruled Plessy v. Ferguson in the public-education context.
Brown v. Board of Education ]]>equal-protection/race-and-national-origin-(pp.-634–657)/school-desegregation-(pp.-634–657)/school-desegregation-(pp.-634–657).htmlEqual Protection/Race and National Origin (pp. 634–657)/School Desegregation (pp. 634–657)/School Desegregation (pp. 634–657).mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTVMI; Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan). Discrimination against women has a long history in the US. Now, women have been the voting majority since 1980.
Level of Scrutiny (pp. 737–752) — the road to intermediate scrutiny (Frontiero v. Richardson; Craig v. Boren; United States v. Virginia; Geduldig v. Aiello).
Gender Stereotypes and Distinctions (pp. 752–772) — application: invalid stereotypes (Orr v. Orr; Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan) vs. valid biological/remedial justifications (Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County; Rostker v. Goldberg; Nguyen v. INS; Califano v. Webster). State the standard.
Drop the VMI buzzword: "exceedingly persuasive justification."
Check for biology (Michael M.; Nguyen).
Check for remedy (Califano v. Webster).
Identify the stereotype kill-shot (Orr v. Orr; MUW). Sexual Orientation: SCOTUS has avoided applying a heightened level of scrutiny. Usually applies rational basis (maybe with bite) or explicitly declines to specify—never truly considered on the merits. Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell Courts all dodged the scrutiny question. Transgender Status: SCOTUS avoided the question in United States v. Skrmetti (2025) (upheld Tenn. ban on gender-affirming care for minors). Multiple Justices concluded that transgender persons lack certain characteristics typically found in suspect classes. Other Justices advocated for intermediate scrutiny. ]]>equal-protection/sex-discrimination-(pp.-737–772)/sex-discrimination-(pp.-737–772).htmlEqual Protection/Sex Discrimination (pp. 737–772)/Sex Discrimination (pp. 737–772).mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTPlessy v. Ferguson in the pre–strict-scrutiny era of race jurisprudence; both predate any modern Equal Protection analysis (the 14th Amendment had not yet been ratified when Dred Scott was decided). Any modern constitutional stance or analysis that would implicitly validate Dred Scott or Plessy is wholly baseless.
Effectively repudiated by the 13th and 14th Amendments, and later by Brown v. Board of Education. ]]>equal-protection/race-and-national-origin-(pp.-634–657)/historical-foundations-(pp.-634–657)/dred-scott-v.-sandford.htmlEqual Protection/Race and National Origin (pp. 634–657)/Historical Foundations (pp. 634–657)/Dred Scott v. Sandford.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTDred Scott v. Sandford in the pre–strict-scrutiny era of race jurisprudence.
Effectively overruled by Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Any modern constitutional stance or analysis that would implicitly validate Dred Scott or Plessy is wholly baseless. ]]>equal-protection/race-and-national-origin-(pp.-634–657)/historical-foundations-(pp.-634–657)/plessy-v.-ferguson.htmlEqual Protection/Race and National Origin (pp. 634–657)/Historical Foundations (pp. 634–657)/Plessy v. Ferguson.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTDred Scott v. Sandford (1857) — African Americans viewed purely as property, not citizens with the right to sue in federal court; "all men are created equal" did not include African Americans. Widely regarded the worst case in SCOTUS history.
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) — "separate but equal" laws do not violate the EPC of the 14A; separation of races upheld as a valid exercise of a state's power to maintain public order. Effectively overruled by Brown v. Board of Education. ]]>equal-protection/race-and-national-origin-(pp.-634–657)/historical-foundations-(pp.-634–657)/historical-foundations-(pp.-634–657).htmlEqual Protection/Race and National Origin (pp. 634–657)/Historical Foundations (pp. 634–657)/Historical Foundations (pp. 634–657).mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTequal-protection/race-and-national-origin-(pp.-634–657)/strict-scrutiny-(pp.-634–657)/palmore-v.-sidoti.htmlEqual Protection/Race and National Origin (pp. 634–657)/Strict Scrutiny (pp. 634–657)/Palmore v. Sidoti.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTLoving v. Virginia (1967) — the end of anti-miscegenation statutes; "equal application" of a statute containing a racial classification does not make it constitutional.
Palmore v. Sidoti (1984) — the effects of private racial prejudice cannot justify a racial classification; strict scrutiny still applies even when designed to protect those classified.
Korematsu v. United States (1944) — pressing public necessity (wartime) may constitute a compelling purpose. No longer good law — see Trump v. Hawaii ("Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided"). Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke (1978) & Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) — race may be considered as a "plus factor" in holistic admissions; strict racial quotas not allowed. Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) v. Harvard/UNC (2023) — diversity is no longer a compelling interest; explicit consideration of race in admissions is not narrowly tailored. Effectively ended race-conscious admissions. Race-neutral remedial measures (e.g., the Texas "Top 10%" / 6% system) currently remain constitutional. ]]>equal-protection/race-and-national-origin-(pp.-634–657)/strict-scrutiny-(pp.-634–657)/strict-scrutiny-(pp.-634–657).htmlEqual Protection/Race and National Origin (pp. 634–657)/Strict Scrutiny (pp. 634–657)/Strict Scrutiny (pp. 634–657).mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTequal-protection/race-and-national-origin-(pp.-634–657)/strict-scrutiny-(pp.-634–657)/korematsu-v.-united-states.htmlEqual Protection/Race and National Origin (pp. 634–657)/Strict Scrutiny (pp. 634–657)/Korematsu v. United States.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTPalmer v. Thompson: both involved government action motivated by racial animus that technically affected all races the same. The difference was that the statute in Loving was facially discriminatory, whereas the action in Palmer was not.
Loving is also a foundational fundamental-rights case. ]]>equal-protection/race-and-national-origin-(pp.-634–657)/strict-scrutiny-(pp.-634–657)/loving-v.-virginia.htmlEqual Protection/Race and National Origin (pp. 634–657)/Strict Scrutiny (pp. 634–657)/Loving v. Virginia.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTHistorical Foundations (pp. 634–657) — the pre–strict-scrutiny era (Dred Scott v. Sandford; Plessy v. Ferguson).
School Desegregation (pp. 634–657) — bedrock of modern strict scrutiny (Brown v. Board of Education).
Strict Scrutiny (pp. 634–657) — modern application: Loving v. Virginia; Palmore v. Sidoti; Korematsu v. United States. ]]>equal-protection/race-and-national-origin-(pp.-634–657)/race-and-national-origin-(pp.-634–657).htmlEqual Protection/Race and National Origin (pp. 634–657)/Race and National Origin (pp. 634–657).mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:40:08 GMTfederal-executive-power/line-item-vetoes.htmlFederal Executive Power/Line Item Vetoes.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:20:49 GMTSuing the President for Injunctive Relief
Civil Suits Against the President
Prosecuting the President
Subpoenaing the President ]]>federal-executive-power/litigation-against-the-president/litigation-against-the-president.htmlFederal Executive Power/Litigation Against the President/Litigation Against the President.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:20:38 GMTfederal-executive-power/litigation-against-the-president/subpoenaing-the-president/trump-v.-mazars.htmlFederal Executive Power/Litigation Against the President/Subpoenaing the President/Trump v. Mazars.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:20:31 GMTfederal-executive-power/litigation-against-the-president/subpoenaing-the-president/trump-v.-vance.htmlFederal Executive Power/Litigation Against the President/Subpoenaing the President/Trump v. Vance.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:17:12 GMTFederal Executive Power/Executive Privilege (pp. 229–242, 253–261)/United States v. Nixon involved a criminal trial. The need for information was much higher; however, this is a civil trial. The holding cannot enforce compliance with a civil proceeding in this case. ]]>federal-executive-power/executive-privilege-(pp.-229–242,-253–261)/cheney-v.-united-states.htmlFederal Executive Power/Executive Privilege (pp. 229–242, 253–261)/Cheney v. United States.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:15:43 GMTUnited States v. Nixon
Cheney v. United States
Trump v. Vance
Trump v. Mazars ]]>federal-executive-power/litigation-against-the-president/subpoenaing-the-president/subpoenaing-the-president.htmlFederal Executive Power/Litigation Against the President/Subpoenaing the President/Subpoenaing the President.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:15:09 GMTfederal-executive-power/litigation-against-the-president/prosecuting-the-president/trump-v.-united-states.htmlFederal Executive Power/Litigation Against the President/Prosecuting the President/Trump v. United States.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:11:49 GMTfederal-executive-power/litigation-against-the-president/civil-suits-against-the-president/clinton-v.-jones.htmlFederal Executive Power/Litigation Against the President/Civil Suits Against the President/Clinton v. Jones.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:11:45 GMTfederal-executive-power/litigation-against-the-president/civil-suits-against-the-president/nixon-v.-fitzgerald.htmlFederal Executive Power/Litigation Against the President/Civil Suits Against the President/Nixon v. Fitzgerald.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:10:21 GMTNixon v. Fitzgerald
Clinton v. Jones ]]>federal-executive-power/litigation-against-the-president/civil-suits-against-the-president/civil-suits-against-the-president.htmlFederal Executive Power/Litigation Against the President/Civil Suits Against the President/Civil Suits Against the President.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:07:42 GMTFederal Executive Power/Executive Privilege (pp. 229–242, 253–261)/United States v. Nixon
Cheney v. United States ]]>federal-executive-power/executive-privilege-(pp.-229–242,-253–261)/executive-privilege-(pp.-229–242,-253–261).htmlFederal Executive Power/Executive Privilege (pp. 229–242, 253–261)/Executive Privilege (pp. 229–242, 253–261).mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:07:18 GMTYoungstown Sheet & Tube. ]]>federal-executive-power/litigation-against-the-president/suing-the-president-for-injunctive-relief.htmlFederal Executive Power/Litigation Against the President/Suing the President for Injunctive Relief.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:06:01 GMTTrump v. United States ]]>federal-executive-power/litigation-against-the-president/prosecuting-the-president/prosecuting-the-president.htmlFederal Executive Power/Litigation Against the President/Prosecuting the President/Prosecuting the President.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:03:15 GMTAppointment and Removal Power (pp. 269–288; Supp. 91–95)
Executive Privilege (pp. 229–242, 253–261)
Line Item Vetoes
Administrative Agencies
Foreign Policy (pp. 288–305)
Immigration (pp. 336–340)
Inherent Presidential Power (pp. 229–242)
Major Questions Doctrine (pp. 253–261)
Prosecuting the President
Litigation Against the President
War Powers (pp. 305–329) ]]>federal-executive-power/federal-executive-power.htmlFederal Executive Power/Federal Executive Power.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:03:07 GMTTrump v. Hawaii ]]>federal-executive-power/immigration-(pp.-336–340)/immigration-(pp.-336–340).htmlFederal Executive Power/Immigration (pp. 336–340)/Immigration (pp. 336–340).mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:00:47 GMTthe rational basis test. ]]>federal-executive-power/immigration-(pp.-336–340)/trump-v.-hawaii.htmlFederal Executive Power/Immigration (pp. 336–340)/Trump v. Hawaii.mdMon, 04 May 2026 19:00:37 GMTFederal Legislative Power. Art. II: The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the military.
The War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (1973), was enacted in response to the Vietnam war. It provided various requirements for the President to follow in order to command the armed forces/military absent a declaration of war. Authorities/Topics Here:
The War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548
Case Study—Iran
War Powers Regarding the War on Terror and Habeas Corpus ]]>federal-executive-power/war-powers-(pp.-305–329)/war-powers-(pp.-305–329).htmlFederal Executive Power/War Powers (pp. 305–329)/War Powers (pp. 305–329).mdMon, 04 May 2026 18:56:40 GMTHamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004). Additionally, this creates an issue for those terrorist-suspects detained in places like Guantanamo Bay, where habeas corpus is not enforced or watched-over much. Habeas Corpus Primer Suspension Clause (Art. I, § 9, cl. 2): habeas corpus cannot be suspended, unless in cases of rebellion or invasion—and in the case that the public safety relies on such suspension. Habeas corpus serves as a fundamental check against the executive's ability to arbitrarily detain individuals. It allows a detainee to go before a federal court and challenge the government's legal authority to detain them.
The Road to Boumediene: Rasul v. Bush (2004): Detainees at Guantanamo Bay have the right to statutory Habeas Corpus. Padilla v. Rumsfeld (2004): American citizens named enemy combatants who are apprehended in the U.S. must file a statutory Habeas Corpus petition where they are currently held. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006): Military commissions established by executive order at Guantanamo Bay are unconstitutional because Congress had not authorized them Congress tried to strip the Court of statutory habeas jurisdiction through the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA); however, the SC held that the DTA didn't apply retroactively. Congressional Response to Hamdan: Military Commissions Act of 2006 Congress explicitly authorized military commissions Limited review of habeas corpus cases for Guantanamo Bay detainees to the Federal Court of Appeals for the Circuit of the District of Columbia. Congress created/authorized Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) to provide the initial authority to detain. Thus, statutory habeas corpus was practically stripped from the AUMF.
Boumediene v. Bush (2008).
See Boumediene Habeas Corpus Process.canvas]]>federal-executive-power/war-powers-(pp.-305–329)/war-powers-regarding-the-war-on-terror-and-habeas-corpus/war-powers-regarding-the-war-on-terror-and-habeas-corpus.htmlFederal Executive Power/War Powers (pp. 305–329)/War Powers Regarding the War on Terror and Habeas Corpus/War Powers Regarding the War on Terror and Habeas Corpus.mdMon, 04 May 2026 18:56:27 GMTfederal-executive-power/war-powers-(pp.-305–329)/war-powers-regarding-the-war-on-terror-and-habeas-corpus/boumediene-habeas-corpus-process.htmlFederal Executive Power/War Powers (pp. 305–329)/War Powers Regarding the War on Terror and Habeas Corpus/Boumediene Habeas Corpus Process.canvasMon, 04 May 2026 18:56:17 GMTfederal-executive-power/war-powers-(pp.-305–329)/war-powers-regarding-the-war-on-terror-and-habeas-corpus/boumediene-v.-bush-(2008).htmlFederal Executive Power/War Powers (pp. 305–329)/War Powers Regarding the War on Terror and Habeas Corpus/Boumediene v. Bush (2008).mdMon, 04 May 2026 18:50:16 GMTfederal-executive-power/war-powers-(pp.-305–329)/war-powers-regarding-the-war-on-terror-and-habeas-corpus/hamdi-v.-rumsfeld-(2004).htmlFederal Executive Power/War Powers (pp. 305–329)/War Powers Regarding the War on Terror and Habeas Corpus/Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004).mdMon, 04 May 2026 18:31:37 GMTLoving v. Virginia
Zablocki v. Redhail
Califano v. Jobst
Bowen v. Owens
United States v. Windsor
Obergefell v. Hodges ]]>fundamental-rights/marriage-&-family-autonomy-(pp.-805–817)/marriage-&-family-autonomy-(pp.-805–817).htmlFundamental Rights/Marriage & Family Autonomy (pp. 805–817)/Marriage & Family Autonomy (pp. 805–817).mdMon, 04 May 2026 18:22:59 GMTfundamental-rights/marriage-&-family-autonomy-(pp.-805–817)/loving-v.-virginia.htmlFundamental Rights/Marriage & Family Autonomy (pp. 805–817)/Loving v. Virginia.mdMon, 04 May 2026 18:22:00 GMTDPC Analysis
Marriage & Family Autonomy (pp. 805–817)
Reproductive Autonomy (pp. 834–844, 859–871)
Sexual Orientation & Activity (pp. 901–911) ]]>fundamental-rights/fundamental-rights.htmlFundamental Rights/Fundamental Rights.mdMon, 04 May 2026 18:20:46 GMTfederal-executive-power/war-powers-(pp.-305–329)/case-study—iran.htmlFederal Executive Power/War Powers (pp. 305–329)/Case Study—Iran.mdMon, 04 May 2026 18:14:40 GMTfederal-executive-power/war-powers-(pp.-305–329)/the-war-powers-resolution,-50-u.s.c.-§§-1541–1548.htmlFederal Executive Power/War Powers (pp. 305–329)/The War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548.mdMon, 04 May 2026 18:09:08 GMTZivotofsky v. Kerry (2015)
U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright (1934) ]]>federal-executive-power/foreign-policy-(pp.-288–305)/foreign-policy-(pp.-288–305).htmlFederal Executive Power/Foreign Policy (pp. 288–305)/Foreign Policy (pp. 288–305).mdMon, 04 May 2026 17:41:41 GMTDames & More v. Regan, Secretary of Treasury (1981) ]]>federal-executive-power/treaties-&-executive-agreements/treaties-&-executive-agreements.htmlFederal Executive Power/Treaties & Executive Agreements/Treaties & Executive Agreements.mdMon, 04 May 2026 17:41:37 GMTAppointment Powers
Removal Powers ]]>federal-executive-power/appointment-and-removal-power-(pp.-269–288;-supp.-91–95)/appointment-and-removal-power-(pp.-269–288;-supp.-91–95).htmlFederal Executive Power/Appointment and Removal Power (pp. 269–288; Supp. 91–95)/Appointment and Removal Power (pp. 269–288; Supp. 91–95).mdMon, 04 May 2026 17:40:54 GMTYoungstown Sheet & Tube ]]>federal-executive-power/inherent-presidential-power-(pp.-229–242)/inherent-presidential-power-(pp.-229–242).htmlFederal Executive Power/Inherent Presidential Power (pp. 229–242)/Inherent Presidential Power (pp. 229–242).mdMon, 04 May 2026 17:40:46 GMTMajor Questions Doctrine (pp. 253–261)
Non-Delegation Doctrine
Legislative Veto Rule ]]>federal-executive-power/administrative-agencies/administrative-agencies.htmlFederal Executive Power/Administrative Agencies/Administrative Agencies.mdMon, 04 May 2026 17:40:41 GMTBuck v. Bell, where the Court held that a person's right to procreate can be sacrificed for the public good. "Three generations of imbeciles is enough." Heavy in the eugenics era. The Modern Rule: procreation is a fundamental right.
See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson.
General Rule: The government cannot prohibit or regulate contraceptive use by married couples, as that creates an invasion of privacy. From Griswold v. Connecticut. Used a "penumbra" analysis. This "penumbra" analysis has been largely abandoned by the Supreme Court in practice. Furtherance: State governments cannot outlaw contraception use for single people but allow it for married couples.
See Eisenstadt v. Baird.
Standard of Review: Any challenge to a state action upon contraception is reviewed under strict scrutiny. See Carey v. Population Services International.
Old Rule: Roe v. Wade held in 1973 that abortion is a fundamental right under the 14th Amendment's Substantive Due Process protection of the broad "right to privacy."
The Court overruled Roe in 2022 with Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization.
Development: The Court abandoned strict scrutiny review of state actions restricting abortion access in 1992 with Planned Parenthood v. Casey. New Rule: abortion is not a fundamental right.
Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization.
Overturned Roe and Casey. Cases Here:
Buck v. Bell
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson
Griswold v. Connecticut
Eisenstadt v. Baird
Carey v. Population Services International
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Planned Parenthood v. Casey
Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization ]]>fundamental-rights/reproductive-autonomy-(pp.-834–844,-859–871)/reproductive-autonomy-(pp.-834–844,-859–871).htmlFundamental Rights/Reproductive Autonomy (pp. 834–844, 859–871)/Reproductive Autonomy (pp. 834–844, 859–871).mdMon, 04 May 2026 17:38:51 GMTGeduldig v. Aiello, there is no Equal Protection Clause violation here, as pregnancy/abortion restrictions are not sex-based classifications. Implication: any restriction on abortion must withstand only rational basis review. Meaning: the action will be sustained if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. ]]>fundamental-rights/reproductive-autonomy-(pp.-834–844,-859–871)/dobbs-v.-jackson-women's-health-organization.htmlFundamental Rights/Reproductive Autonomy (pp. 834–844, 859–871)/Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization.mdMon, 04 May 2026 17:37:42 GMTfundamental-rights/reproductive-autonomy-(pp.-834–844,-859–871)/planned-parenthood-v.-casey.htmlFundamental Rights/Reproductive Autonomy (pp. 834–844, 859–871)/Planned Parenthood v. Casey.mdMon, 04 May 2026 17:33:45 GMTfederal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/mootness/capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review/roe-v.-wade,-410-u.s.-113-(1973)..htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Mootness/Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review/Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)..mdMon, 04 May 2026 17:31:46 GMTfundamental-rights/reproductive-autonomy-(pp.-834–844,-859–871)/carey-v.-population-services-international.htmlFundamental Rights/Reproductive Autonomy (pp. 834–844, 859–871)/Carey v. Population Services International.mdMon, 04 May 2026 17:25:32 GMTfundamental-rights/reproductive-autonomy-(pp.-834–844,-859–871)/eisenstadt-v.-baird.htmlFundamental Rights/Reproductive Autonomy (pp. 834–844, 859–871)/Eisenstadt v. Baird.mdMon, 04 May 2026 17:24:47 GMTfundamental-rights/reproductive-autonomy-(pp.-834–844,-859–871)/griswold-v.-connecticut.htmlFundamental Rights/Reproductive Autonomy (pp. 834–844, 859–871)/Griswold v. Connecticut.mdMon, 04 May 2026 17:21:04 GMTfundamental-rights/reproductive-autonomy-(pp.-834–844,-859–871)/skinner-v.-oklahoma-ex-rel.-williamson.htmlFundamental Rights/Reproductive Autonomy (pp. 834–844, 859–871)/Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson.mdMon, 04 May 2026 17:20:54 GMTfundamental-rights/reproductive-autonomy-(pp.-834–844,-859–871)/buck-v.-bell.htmlFundamental Rights/Reproductive Autonomy (pp. 834–844, 859–871)/Buck v. Bell.mdMon, 04 May 2026 17:16:07 GMTfundamental-rights/sexual-orientation-&-activity-(pp.-901–911)/lawrence-v.-texas.htmlFundamental Rights/Sexual Orientation & Activity (pp. 901–911)/Lawrence v. Texas.mdMon, 04 May 2026 17:13:47 GMTfundamental-rights/sexual-orientation-&-activity-(pp.-901–911)/bowers-v.-hardwick.htmlFundamental Rights/Sexual Orientation & Activity (pp. 901–911)/Bowers v. Hardwick.mdMon, 04 May 2026 17:11:51 GMTBowers v. Hardwick
Lawrence v. Texas ]]>fundamental-rights/sexual-orientation-&-activity-(pp.-901–911)/sexual-orientation-&-activity-(pp.-901–911).htmlFundamental Rights/Sexual Orientation & Activity (pp. 901–911)/Sexual Orientation & Activity (pp. 901–911).mdMon, 04 May 2026 17:10:58 GMTfundamental-rights/marriage-&-family-autonomy-(pp.-805–817)/obergefell-v.-hodges.htmlFundamental Rights/Marriage & Family Autonomy (pp. 805–817)/Obergefell v. Hodges.mdSun, 03 May 2026 23:55:44 GMTfundamental-rights/marriage-&-family-autonomy-(pp.-805–817)/united-states-v.-windsor.htmlFundamental Rights/Marriage & Family Autonomy (pp. 805–817)/United States v. Windsor.mdSun, 03 May 2026 23:53:44 GMTCalifano v. Jobst
Bowen v. Owens Takeaway: the interference must be direct and substantial Not indirect, like with Califano and Bowen. ]]>fundamental-rights/marriage-&-family-autonomy-(pp.-805–817)/zablocki-v.-redhail.htmlFundamental Rights/Marriage & Family Autonomy (pp. 805–817)/Zablocki v. Redhail.mdSun, 03 May 2026 23:52:23 GMTfundamental-rights/marriage-&-family-autonomy-(pp.-805–817)/bowen-v.-owens.htmlFundamental Rights/Marriage & Family Autonomy (pp. 805–817)/Bowen v. Owens.mdSun, 03 May 2026 23:51:51 GMTfundamental-rights/marriage-&-family-autonomy-(pp.-805–817)/califano-v.-jobst.htmlFundamental Rights/Marriage & Family Autonomy (pp. 805–817)/Califano v. Jobst.mdSun, 03 May 2026 23:50:41 GMTfundamental-rights/dpc-analysis/framework-for-dpc-analysis.htmlFundamental Rights/DPC Analysis/Framework for DPC Analysis.mdSun, 03 May 2026 23:44:14 GMTMcDonald v. City of Chicago. The right to self-defense there was seen as deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition; thus, it was a fundamental right. Many fundamental right are protected by both Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection. There is no big difference in the analysis Fundamental rights under SDP focus on determining if there is a sufficient governmental purpose, whereas Equal Protection focuses on whether the government's denial of the right to certain people is justified by purpose. The Role of the 9th Amendment Here Doesn't protect rights itself; rather, it justifies the existence and protection of unenumerated rights. ]]>fundamental-rights/dpc-analysis/concept-of-fundamental-rights.htmlFundamental Rights/DPC Analysis/Concept of Fundamental Rights.mdSun, 03 May 2026 23:37:41 GMTfundamental-rights/dpc-analysis/sdp-v.-pdp-frameworks/united-states-v.-carolene-products-co..htmlFundamental Rights/DPC Analysis/SDP v. PDP Frameworks/United States v. Carolene Products Co..mdSun, 03 May 2026 23:29:11 GMTUnited States v. Carolene Products Co.. ]]>fundamental-rights/dpc-analysis/sdp-v.-pdp-frameworks/sdp-v.-pdp-frameworks.htmlFundamental Rights/DPC Analysis/SDP v. PDP Frameworks/SDP v. PDP Frameworks.mdSun, 03 May 2026 23:28:38 GMTfundamental-rights/dpc-analysis/procedural-v.-substantive-due-process.htmlFundamental Rights/DPC Analysis/Procedural v. Substantive Due Process.mdSun, 03 May 2026 23:25:41 GMTProcedural v. Substantive Due Process
SDP v. PDP Frameworks
Concept of Fundamental Rights
Framework for DPC Analysis ]]>fundamental-rights/dpc-analysis/dpc-analysis.htmlFundamental Rights/DPC Analysis/DPC Analysis.mdSun, 03 May 2026 23:24:07 GMTPalko v. Connecticut: foundational framework for incorporation Framework: to be incorporated, the right must be "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty" and "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Not all constitutional rights meet this standard. In this case, the Court held that double jeopardy did not meet this standard; overturned in Benton v. Maryland, but the standard is still relevant.
Adamson v. California: 5th amendment's failed attempt at incorporation Reaffirmed Palko, wherein not all rights are to be incorporated. Here, the 5th Amendment's right against self-incrimination was not incorporated; overturned in Malloy v. Hogan. Modern Incorporation Doctrine
McDonald v. City of Chicago
Ramos v. Louisiana
Timbs v. Indiana Unincorporated Bill of Rights Provisions: 3rd Amendment's prohibition against quartering soldiers; would like be incorporated if challenged. 5th Amendment's right to a grand jury indictment in criminal cases. 7th Amendment's right to a jury trial in a civil case. States can eliminate juries in civil trials without violating the Constitution. ]]>civil-&-economic-liberties/incorporation-(pp.-447–448,-458–474)/incorporation-(pp.-447–448,-458–474).htmlCivil & Economic Liberties/Incorporation (pp. 447–448, 458–474)/Incorporation (pp. 447–448, 458–474).mdSun, 03 May 2026 23:15:46 GMTcivil-&-economic-liberties/state-action-doctrine-(pp.-474–491)/entanglement-exception-(pp.-474–491)/jackson-v.-metropolitan-edison-co..htmlCivil & Economic Liberties/State Action Doctrine (pp. 474–491)/Entanglement Exception (pp. 474–491)/Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co..mdSun, 03 May 2026 23:14:47 GMTCivil Rights Cases ]]>civil-&-economic-liberties/state-action-doctrine-(pp.-474–491)/foundations-(pp.-474–491)/foundations-(pp.-474–491).htmlCivil & Economic Liberties/State Action Doctrine (pp. 474–491)/Foundations (pp. 474–491)/Foundations (pp. 474–491).mdSun, 03 May 2026 23:12:56 GMTcivil-&-economic-liberties/state-action-doctrine-(pp.-474–491)/foundations-(pp.-474–491)/civil-rights-cases.htmlCivil & Economic Liberties/State Action Doctrine (pp. 474–491)/Foundations (pp. 474–491)/Civil Rights Cases.mdSun, 03 May 2026 23:12:50 GMTCivil Rights Cases (1883): before the exception was recognized The 14th Amendment does not apply to purely private conduct. Private discrimination must be addressed under state tort/statutory law—not the Constitution. Topics Here:
Entanglement Exception (pp. 474–491)
Foundations (pp. 474–491)
Public Functions Exception (pp. 474–491) ]]>civil-&-economic-liberties/state-action-doctrine-(pp.-474–491)/state-action-doctrine-(pp.-474–491).htmlCivil & Economic Liberties/State Action Doctrine (pp. 474–491)/State Action Doctrine (pp. 474–491).mdSun, 03 May 2026 23:12:37 GMTcivil-&-economic-liberties/state-action-doctrine-(pp.-474–491)/public-functions-exception-(pp.-474–491)/manhattan-community-access-corp.-v.-halleck.htmlCivil & Economic Liberties/State Action Doctrine (pp. 474–491)/Public Functions Exception (pp. 474–491)/Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck.mdSun, 03 May 2026 23:11:08 GMTcivil-&-economic-liberties/state-action-doctrine-(pp.-474–491)/public-functions-exception-(pp.-474–491)/hudgens-v.-nlrb.htmlCivil & Economic Liberties/State Action Doctrine (pp. 474–491)/Public Functions Exception (pp. 474–491)/Hudgens v. NLRB.mdSun, 03 May 2026 23:10:01 GMTcivil-&-economic-liberties/state-action-doctrine-(pp.-474–491)/public-functions-exception-(pp.-474–491)/evans-v.-newton.htmlCivil & Economic Liberties/State Action Doctrine (pp. 474–491)/Public Functions Exception (pp. 474–491)/Evans v. Newton.mdSun, 03 May 2026 23:08:21 GMTcivil-&-economic-liberties/state-action-doctrine-(pp.-474–491)/public-functions-exception-(pp.-474–491)/terry-v.-adams.htmlCivil & Economic Liberties/State Action Doctrine (pp. 474–491)/Public Functions Exception (pp. 474–491)/Terry v. Adams.mdSun, 03 May 2026 23:00:16 GMTcivil-&-economic-liberties/state-action-doctrine-(pp.-474–491)/public-functions-exception-(pp.-474–491)/marsh-v.-alabama.htmlCivil & Economic Liberties/State Action Doctrine (pp. 474–491)/Public Functions Exception (pp. 474–491)/Marsh v. Alabama.mdSun, 03 May 2026 22:57:39 GMTJackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. ]]>civil-&-economic-liberties/state-action-doctrine-(pp.-474–491)/entanglement-exception-(pp.-474–491)/entanglement-exception-(pp.-474–491).htmlCivil & Economic Liberties/State Action Doctrine (pp. 474–491)/Entanglement Exception (pp. 474–491)/Entanglement Exception (pp. 474–491).mdSun, 03 May 2026 22:56:10 GMTEvans v. Newton
Hudgens v. NLRB
Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck
Marsh v. Alabama
Terry v. Adams ]]>civil-&-economic-liberties/state-action-doctrine-(pp.-474–491)/public-functions-exception-(pp.-474–491)/public-functions-exception-(pp.-474–491).htmlCivil & Economic Liberties/State Action Doctrine (pp. 474–491)/Public Functions Exception (pp. 474–491)/Public Functions Exception (pp. 474–491).mdSun, 03 May 2026 22:54:27 GMTcivil-&-economic-liberties/incorporation-(pp.-447–448,-458–474)/ramos-v.-louisiana.htmlCivil & Economic Liberties/Incorporation (pp. 447–448, 458–474)/Ramos v. Louisiana.mdSun, 03 May 2026 22:50:04 GMTcivil-&-economic-liberties/incorporation-(pp.-447–448,-458–474)/timbs-v.-indiana.htmlCivil & Economic Liberties/Incorporation (pp. 447–448, 458–474)/Timbs v. Indiana.mdSun, 03 May 2026 22:48:37 GMTcivil-&-economic-liberties/incorporation-(pp.-447–448,-458–474)/mcdonald-v.-city-of-chicago.htmlCivil & Economic Liberties/Incorporation (pp. 447–448, 458–474)/McDonald v. City of Chicago.mdSun, 03 May 2026 22:47:13 GMTfederal-legislative-power/state-sovereignty-(pp.-143–157).htmlFederal Legislative Power/State Sovereignty (pp. 143–157).mdSun, 03 May 2026 00:17:41 GMTcivil-&-economic-liberties/civil-rights-defined/civil-rights-defined.htmlCivil & Economic Liberties/Civil Rights Defined/Civil Rights Defined.mdSat, 02 May 2026 21:36:02 GMTYoungstown Sheet & Tube. ]]>federal-executive-power/treaties-&-executive-agreements/dames-&-more-v.-regan,-secretary-of-treasury-(1981).htmlFederal Executive Power/Treaties & Executive Agreements/Dames & More v. Regan, Secretary of Treasury (1981).mdSat, 02 May 2026 21:19:25 GMTfederal-executive-power/foreign-policy-(pp.-288–305)/u.s.-v.-curtiss-wright-(1934).htmlFederal Executive Power/Foreign Policy (pp. 288–305)/U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright (1934).mdSat, 02 May 2026 21:14:25 GMTYoungstown Sheet & Tube). Remember: Zone 3 is when the President is acting against the explicit/implied will of Congress. Justification: Recognition of foreign nations has many implications; thus, it has to be done unequivocally, through one voice. Congress may not overrule a President's recognition of the country. From this case: even though Congress passed a statute saying people born in Jerusalem could list “Jerusalem, Israel” as their Place of Birth, the President was still able to deny the π’s request to do so in their passport; the President’s authority was conclusive and preclusive. ]]>federal-executive-power/foreign-policy-(pp.-288–305)/zivotofsky-v.-kerry-(2015).htmlFederal Executive Power/Foreign Policy (pp. 288–305)/Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015).mdSat, 02 May 2026 21:11:01 GMTMyers v. United States (1926). Congress can limit removal by statute if: It is an office for which independence from the President is desirable; and The statute in question does not prohibit removal and only limits it to a good-cause standard.
Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935) and Morrison v. Olson (1988).
There is no double for-cause removal protection. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (2010).
Congress may limit presidential removal for multimember bodies, but not where an agency is headed by a single person. Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935) and Seila Law LLC v. CFPB (2020).
Congress may limit removal to a good cause standard if the officer is with part of a multimember expert agency, see Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935) and Seila Law LLC v. CFPB (2020), OR an inferior officer with narrowly circumscribed duties whose protection does not impermissibly impede the President's Article II duties. Morrison v. Olson (1988). Multimember expert agencies—requirements for satisfaction of the good-cause removal standard: Multimember structure Nonpartisan structure Staggered terms The officers do not wield substantial executive power Implication: the board can be made of principal officers protected by a good cause standard if these requirements are met. Add'l Cases Here:
Wiener v. United States (1958)
Bowsher v. Synar (1986)
Kennedy v. Braidwood Management (2025) ]]>federal-executive-power/appointment-and-removal-power-(pp.-269–288;-supp.-91–95)/removal-powers/removal-powers.htmlFederal Executive Power/Appointment and Removal Power (pp. 269–288; Supp. 91–95)/Removal Powers/Removal Powers.mdSat, 02 May 2026 21:02:26 GMTHumphrey's Executor v. United States (1935). The tenure protection allowed for certain inferior officers with narrowly circumscribed duties. From this case: CFPB leader was insulated form presidential control; this violated the separation of powers and was unconstitutional. The position was altered to be removable by the President. ]]>federal-executive-power/appointment-and-removal-power-(pp.-269–288;-supp.-91–95)/removal-powers/seila-law-llc-v.-cfpb-(2020).htmlFederal Executive Power/Appointment and Removal Power (pp. 269–288; Supp. 91–95)/Removal Powers/Seila Law LLC v. CFPB (2020).mdSat, 02 May 2026 20:56:14 GMTKennedy Process.canvas ]]>federal-executive-power/appointment-and-removal-power-(pp.-269–288;-supp.-91–95)/removal-powers/kennedy-v.-braidwood-management-(2025).htmlFederal Executive Power/Appointment and Removal Power (pp. 269–288; Supp. 91–95)/Removal Powers/Kennedy v. Braidwood Management (2025).mdSat, 02 May 2026 20:55:47 GMTfederal-executive-power/appointment-and-removal-power-(pp.-269–288;-supp.-91–95)/removal-powers/kennedy-process.htmlFederal Executive Power/Appointment and Removal Power (pp. 269–288; Supp. 91–95)/Removal Powers/Kennedy Process.canvasSat, 02 May 2026 20:54:41 GMTfederal-executive-power/appointment-and-removal-power-(pp.-269–288;-supp.-91–95)/removal-powers/free-enterprise-fund-v.-public-company-accounting-oversight-board-(2010).htmlFederal Executive Power/Appointment and Removal Power (pp. 269–288; Supp. 91–95)/Removal Powers/Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (2010).mdSat, 02 May 2026 20:49:36 GMTfederal-executive-power/appointment-and-removal-power-(pp.-269–288;-supp.-91–95)/removal-powers/bowsher-v.-synar-(1986).htmlFederal Executive Power/Appointment and Removal Power (pp. 269–288; Supp. 91–95)/Removal Powers/Bowsher v. Synar (1986).mdSat, 02 May 2026 20:48:08 GMTfederal-executive-power/appointment-and-removal-power-(pp.-269–288;-supp.-91–95)/removal-powers/wiener-v.-united-states-(1958).htmlFederal Executive Power/Appointment and Removal Power (pp. 269–288; Supp. 91–95)/Removal Powers/Wiener v. United States (1958).mdSat, 02 May 2026 20:46:54 GMTMyers v. United States (1926): the USPS was a purely executive agency (President may remove without limitation), whereas the FTC performed a broader range of duties, thus allowing Congress to impose limitations on the President's removal powers of the FTC Commissioner.
NOTE: This has become an outdated standard. Use Morrison v. Olson (1988). ]]>federal-executive-power/appointment-and-removal-power-(pp.-269–288;-supp.-91–95)/removal-powers/humphrey's-executor-v.-united-states-(1935).htmlFederal Executive Power/Appointment and Removal Power (pp. 269–288; Supp. 91–95)/Removal Powers/Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935).mdSat, 02 May 2026 20:45:09 GMTfederal-executive-power/appointment-and-removal-power-(pp.-269–288;-supp.-91–95)/removal-powers/myers-v.-united-states-(1926).htmlFederal Executive Power/Appointment and Removal Power (pp. 269–288; Supp. 91–95)/Removal Powers/Myers v. United States (1926).mdSat, 02 May 2026 20:40:14 GMTNLRB v. Noel Canning.]]>federal-executive-power/appointment-and-removal-power-(pp.-269–288;-supp.-91–95)/recess-appointments/recess-appointments.htmlFederal Executive Power/Appointment and Removal Power (pp. 269–288; Supp. 91–95)/Recess Appointments/Recess Appointments.mdSat, 02 May 2026 20:34:31 GMTfederal-executive-power/appointment-and-removal-power-(pp.-269–288;-supp.-91–95)/recess-appointments/nlrb-v.-noel-canning.htmlFederal Executive Power/Appointment and Removal Power (pp. 269–288; Supp. 91–95)/Recess Appointments/NLRB v. Noel Canning.mdSat, 02 May 2026 20:33:12 GMTfederal-executive-power/appointment-and-removal-power-(pp.-269–288;-supp.-91–95)/appointment-powers/morrison-v.-olson-(1988).htmlFederal Executive Power/Appointment and Removal Power (pp. 269–288; Supp. 91–95)/Appointment Powers/Morrison v. Olson (1988).mdSat, 02 May 2026 20:32:03 GMTfederal-executive-power/appointment-and-removal-power-(pp.-269–288;-supp.-91–95)/appointment-powers/lucia-v.-securities-&-exchange-commission.htmlFederal Executive Power/Appointment and Removal Power (pp. 269–288; Supp. 91–95)/Appointment Powers/Lucia v. Securities & Exchange Commission.mdSat, 02 May 2026 20:26:24 GMTfederal-executive-power/appointment-and-removal-power-(pp.-269–288;-supp.-91–95)/appointment-powers/appointment-powers.htmlFederal Executive Power/Appointment and Removal Power (pp. 269–288; Supp. 91–95)/Appointment Powers/Appointment Powers.mdSat, 02 May 2026 20:25:05 GMTINS v. Chadha (1983). ]]>federal-executive-power/administrative-agencies/legislative-veto-rule/legislative-veto-rule.htmlFederal Executive Power/Administrative Agencies/Legislative Veto Rule/Legislative Veto Rule.mdSat, 02 May 2026 20:20:08 GMTfederal-executive-power/administrative-agencies/legislative-veto-rule/ins-v.-chadha-(1983).htmlFederal Executive Power/Administrative Agencies/Legislative Veto Rule/INS v. Chadha (1983).mdSat, 02 May 2026 20:19:50 GMTfederal-executive-power/administrative-agencies/non-delegation-doctrine/non-delegation-doctrine.htmlFederal Executive Power/Administrative Agencies/Non-Delegation Doctrine/Non-Delegation Doctrine.mdSat, 02 May 2026 20:18:21 GMTfederal-executive-power/administrative-agencies/major-questions-doctrine-(pp.-253–261)/biden-v.-nebraska.htmlFederal Executive Power/Administrative Agencies/Major Questions Doctrine (pp. 253–261)/Biden v. Nebraska.mdSat, 02 May 2026 19:50:55 GMTfederal-executive-power/administrative-agencies/major-questions-doctrine-(pp.-253–261)/west-virginia-v.-epa.htmlFederal Executive Power/Administrative Agencies/Major Questions Doctrine (pp. 253–261)/West Virginia v. EPA.mdSat, 02 May 2026 19:36:40 GMTWest Virginia v. EPA
Biden v. Nebraska ]]>federal-executive-power/administrative-agencies/major-questions-doctrine-(pp.-253–261)/major-questions-doctrine-(pp.-253–261).htmlFederal Executive Power/Administrative Agencies/Major Questions Doctrine (pp. 253–261)/Major Questions Doctrine (pp. 253–261).mdSat, 02 May 2026 19:35:23 GMTfederal-executive-power/executive-privilege-(pp.-229–242,-253–261)/united-states-v.-nixon.htmlFederal Executive Power/Executive Privilege (pp. 229–242, 253–261)/United States v. Nixon.mdSat, 02 May 2026 19:26:45 GMTfederal-executive-power/inherent-presidential-power-(pp.-229–242)/youngstown-sheet-&-tube.htmlFederal Executive Power/Inherent Presidential Power (pp. 229–242)/Youngstown Sheet & Tube.mdSat, 02 May 2026 19:16:16 GMTCity of Boerne v. Flores Congress can only create remedial statutes for enforcement of the 14th Amendment. Test: Congruence and Proportionality There must be a direct link between the injury and the remedy (congruence) The law must be a proportional response ot a documented history of constitutional violations by the States (proportionality).
Shelby County v. Holder Congress's enforcement powers under the 14th Amendment are purely remedial and must be in response to current constitutional violations. 15th Amendment: etc. `` ]]>federal-legislative-power/post-civil-war-amendments-(pp.-207–218)/post-civil-war-amendments-(pp.-207–218).htmlFederal Legislative Power/Post-Civil War Amendments (pp. 207–218)/Post-Civil War Amendments (pp. 207–218).mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 15:49:16 GMTLearning Resources v. Trump
South Dakota v. Dole
Sabri v. U.S.
U.S. v. Butler ]]>federal-legislative-power/taxing-and-spending-power-(pp.-201–207-+-learning-resources-canvas)/taxing-and-spending-power-(pp.-201–207-+-learning-resources-canvas).htmlFederal Legislative Power/Taxing and Spending Power (pp. 201–207 + Learning Resources Canvas)/Taxing and Spending Power (pp. 201–207 + Learning Resources Canvas).mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 15:44:51 GMTfederal-legislative-power/taxing-and-spending-power-(pp.-201–207-+-learning-resources-canvas)/learning-resources-v.-trump.htmlFederal Legislative Power/Taxing and Spending Power (pp. 201–207 + Learning Resources Canvas)/Learning Resources v. Trump.mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 15:43:45 GMTfederal-legislative-power/taxing-and-spending-power-(pp.-201–207-+-learning-resources-canvas)/sebelius.htmlFederal Legislative Power/Taxing and Spending Power (pp. 201–207 + Learning Resources Canvas)/Sebelius.mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 15:40:03 GMTfederal-legislative-power/taxing-and-spending-power-(pp.-201–207-+-learning-resources-canvas)/south-dakota-v.-dole.htmlFederal Legislative Power/Taxing and Spending Power (pp. 201–207 + Learning Resources Canvas)/South Dakota v. Dole.mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 15:37:34 GMTfederal-legislative-power/taxing-and-spending-power-(pp.-201–207-+-learning-resources-canvas)/oklahoma-v.-united-states-civil-service-commission-(1947).htmlFederal Legislative Power/Taxing and Spending Power (pp. 201–207 + Learning Resources Canvas)/Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission (1947).mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 15:34:47 GMTfederal-legislative-power/taxing-and-spending-power-(pp.-201–207-+-learning-resources-canvas)/sabri-v.-u.s..htmlFederal Legislative Power/Taxing and Spending Power (pp. 201–207 + Learning Resources Canvas)/Sabri v. U.S..mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 15:33:02 GMTfederal-legislative-power/taxing-and-spending-power-(pp.-201–207-+-learning-resources-canvas)/chas-c.-steward-co.-v.-davis-(1937).htmlFederal Legislative Power/Taxing and Spending Power (pp. 201–207 + Learning Resources Canvas)/Chas C. Steward Co. v. Davis (1937).mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 15:30:15 GMTfederal-legislative-power/taxing-and-spending-power-(pp.-201–207-+-learning-resources-canvas)/u.s.-v.-butler.htmlFederal Legislative Power/Taxing and Spending Power (pp. 201–207 + Learning Resources Canvas)/U.S. v. Butler.mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 15:24:59 GMTMurphy v. NCAA (2018)
Printz v. United States (1997)
Reno v. Condon (2000) ]]>federal-legislative-power/tenth-amendment-&-anti-commandeering-(pp.-189–201)/tenth-amendment-&-anti-commandeering-(pp.-189–201).htmlFederal Legislative Power/Tenth Amendment & Anti-Commandeering (pp. 189–201)/Tenth Amendment & Anti-Commandeering (pp. 189–201).mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 15:20:22 GMTfederal-legislative-power/tenth-amendment-&-anti-commandeering-(pp.-189–201)/murphy-v.-ncaa-(2018).htmlFederal Legislative Power/Tenth Amendment & Anti-Commandeering (pp. 189–201)/Murphy v. NCAA (2018).mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 15:18:40 GMTfederal-legislative-power/tenth-amendment-&-anti-commandeering-(pp.-189–201)/reno-v.-condon-(2000).htmlFederal Legislative Power/Tenth Amendment & Anti-Commandeering (pp. 189–201)/Reno v. Condon (2000).mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 15:16:25 GMTfederal-legislative-power/tenth-amendment-&-anti-commandeering-(pp.-189–201)/printz-v.-united-states-(1997).htmlFederal Legislative Power/Tenth Amendment & Anti-Commandeering (pp. 189–201)/Printz v. United States (1997).mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 15:12:52 GMTfederal-legislative-power/tenth-amendment-&-anti-commandeering-(pp.-189–201)/ny-v.-us-(1992).htmlFederal Legislative Power/Tenth Amendment & Anti-Commandeering (pp. 189–201)/NY v. US (1992).mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 15:12:11 GMTfederal-legislative-power/modern-limits-(pp.-157–181)/dual-sovereignty.htmlFederal Legislative Power/Modern Limits (pp. 157–181)/Dual sovereignty.mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 15:09:46 GMTfederal-legislative-power/modern-limits-(pp.-157–181)/gonzales-v.-raich.htmlFederal Legislative Power/Modern Limits (pp. 157–181)/Gonzales v. Raich.mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 15:06:46 GMTfederal-legislative-power/modern-limits-(pp.-157–181)/jones-v.-alfred-h.-mayer-co.,-392-u.s.-409-(1968)..htmlFederal Legislative Power/Modern Limits (pp. 157–181)/Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)..mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 15:04:10 GMTfederal-legislative-power/modern-limits-(pp.-157–181)/cook-county-v.-united-states-army-corps-of-engineers,-531-u.s.-159-(2001)..htmlFederal Legislative Power/Modern Limits (pp. 157–181)/Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)..mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 15:03:42 GMTfederal-legislative-power/modern-limits-(pp.-157–181)/pierce-county,-wa-v.-guillen.htmlFederal Legislative Power/Modern Limits (pp. 157–181)/Pierce County, WA v. Guillen.mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 15:03:07 GMTfederal-legislative-power/modern-limits-(pp.-157–181)/u.s.-v.-morrison.htmlFederal Legislative Power/Modern Limits (pp. 157–181)/U.S. v. Morrison.mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 15:02:28 GMTfederal-legislative-power/modern-limits-(pp.-157–181)/u.s.-v.-lopez.htmlFederal Legislative Power/Modern Limits (pp. 157–181)/U.S. v. Lopez.mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 14:59:39 GMTHeart of Atlanta Motel v. United States
Katzenbach v. McClung ]]>federal-legislative-power/commerce-power-(pp.-129–181)/civil-rights-era-(pp.-143–157)/civil-rights-era-(pp.-143–157).htmlFederal Legislative Power/Commerce Power (pp. 129–181)/Civil Rights Era (pp. 143–157)/Civil Rights Era (pp. 143–157).mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 14:54:24 GMTfederal-legislative-power/commerce-power-(pp.-129–181)/civil-rights-era-(pp.-143–157)/hodel-v.-indiana.htmlFederal Legislative Power/Commerce Power (pp. 129–181)/Civil Rights Era (pp. 143–157)/Hodel v. Indiana.mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 14:53:31 GMTfederal-legislative-power/commerce-power-(pp.-129–181)/civil-rights-era-(pp.-143–157)/garcia-v.-san-antonio-metropolitan-transit-authority.htmlFederal Legislative Power/Commerce Power (pp. 129–181)/Civil Rights Era (pp. 143–157)/Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 14:53:20 GMTfederal-legislative-power/commerce-power-(pp.-129–181)/civil-rights-era-(pp.-143–157)/perez-v.-united-state.htmlFederal Legislative Power/Commerce Power (pp. 129–181)/Civil Rights Era (pp. 143–157)/Perez v. United State.mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 14:51:29 GMTfederal-legislative-power/commerce-power-(pp.-129–181)/civil-rights-era-(pp.-143–157)/katzenbach-v.-mcclung.htmlFederal Legislative Power/Commerce Power (pp. 129–181)/Civil Rights Era (pp. 143–157)/Katzenbach v. McClung.mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 14:49:45 GMTfederal-legislative-power/commerce-power-(pp.-129–181)/civil-rights-era-(pp.-143–157)/heart-of-atlanta-motel-v.-united-states.htmlFederal Legislative Power/Commerce Power (pp. 129–181)/Civil Rights Era (pp. 143–157)/Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States.mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 14:49:11 GMTfederal-legislative-power/commerce-power-(pp.-129–181)/new-deal-era-(expansive-commerce-power)/wickard-v.-filburn.htmlFederal Legislative Power/Commerce Power (pp. 129–181)/New Deal Era (Expansive Commerce Power)/Wickard v. Filburn.mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 14:48:24 GMTHammer v. Dagenhart. Congress can regulate purly intrastate commerce if thsi activity has a substantial effect ]]>federal-legislative-power/commerce-power-(pp.-129–181)/new-deal-era-(expansive-commerce-power)/u.s.-v.-darby-lumber-co.htmlFederal Legislative Power/Commerce Power (pp. 129–181)/New Deal Era (Expansive Commerce Power)/U.S. v. Darby Lumber Co.mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 14:47:48 GMTfederal-legislative-power/commerce-power-(pp.-129–181)/new-deal-era-(expansive-commerce-power)/nlrb-v.-jones-&-laughlin.htmlFederal Legislative Power/Commerce Power (pp. 129–181)/New Deal Era (Expansive Commerce Power)/NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin.mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 14:46:54 GMTCivil Rights Era (pp. 143–157)
Foundational Era (pp. 129–143)
Modern Limits (pp. 157–181)
New Deal Era (Expansive Commerce Power)
State Sovereignty (pp. 143–157) ]]>federal-legislative-power/commerce-power-(pp.-129–181)/commerce-power-(pp.-129–181).htmlFederal Legislative Power/Commerce Power (pp. 129–181)/Commerce Power (pp. 129–181).mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 14:45:32 GMTfederal-legislative-power/commerce-power-(pp.-129–181)/foundational-era-(pp.-129–143)/hammer-v.-dagenhart.htmlFederal Legislative Power/Commerce Power (pp. 129–181)/Foundational Era (pp. 129–143)/Hammer v. Dagenhart.mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 14:44:28 GMTfederal-legislative-power/commerce-power-(pp.-129–181)/foundational-era-(pp.-129–143)/lochner-v.-new-york-(1905)..htmlFederal Legislative Power/Commerce Power (pp. 129–181)/Foundational Era (pp. 129–143)/Lochner v. New York (1905)..mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 14:40:27 GMTfederal-legislative-power/commerce-power-(pp.-129–181)/necessary-and-proper-clause-(pp.-99–111)/mccullough-v.-maryland..htmlFederal Legislative Power/Commerce Power (pp. 129–181)/Necessary and Proper Clause (pp. 99–111)/McCullough v. Maryland..mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 14:39:17 GMTMcCullough v. Maryland. Art. I, § 1: Legislative power to Congress. Topics Here:
Commerce Power (pp. 129–181)
Necessary and Proper Clause (pp. 99–111)
Taxing and Spending Power (pp. 201–207 + Learning Resources Canvas)
Tenth Amendment & Anti-Commandeering (pp. 189–201)
Post-Civil War Amendments (pp. 207–218) ]]>federal-legislative-power/federal-legislative-power.htmlFederal Legislative Power/Federal Legislative Power.mdThu, 30 Apr 2026 14:36:46 GMTDiscriminatory Purpose vs. Effect (pp. 657–676)
Race and National Origin (pp. 634–657)
Rational Basis (pp. 609–634)
Sex Discrimination (pp. 737–772) ]]>equal-protection/equal-protection.htmlEqual Protection/Equal Protection.mdWed, 29 Apr 2026 21:07:27 GMTAbbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)
303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 143 S. Ct. 2298 (2023).
Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972).
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014). ]]>federal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/ripeness-(pp.-62–76)/ripeness-(pp.-62–76).htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Ripeness (pp. 62–76)/Ripeness (pp. 62–76).mdMon, 27 Apr 2026 23:01:46 GMTMcCullough v. Maryland. ]]>federal-legislative-power/commerce-power-(pp.-129–181)/necessary-and-proper-clause-(pp.-99–111)/necessary-and-proper-clause-(pp.-99–111).htmlFederal Legislative Power/Commerce Power (pp. 129–181)/Necessary and Proper Clause (pp. 99–111)/Necessary and Proper Clause (pp. 99–111).mdMon, 27 Apr 2026 16:36:01 GMTconlaw-reading-list.htmlConLaw Reading List.mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 21:59:37 GMTIncorporation (pp. 447–448, 458–474)
State Action Doctrine (pp. 474–491) ]]>civil-&-economic-liberties/civil-&-economic-liberties.htmlCivil & Economic Liberties/Civil & Economic Liberties.mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 21:55:40 GMTFederal Judicial Power
Federal Legislative Power
Federal Executive Power
Civil & Economic Liberties
Equal Protection
Fundamental Rights ]]>constitutional-law.htmlVault.mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 21:54:51 GMTTheories of Interpretation (pp. 10–12; Heller pp. 914–929)
Judicial Review (pp. 1–9)
Congressional Limits on Judicial Power (pp. 12–18)
Universal Injunctions (Supp. pp. 1–25)
Justiciability Doctrines ]]>federal-judicial-power/federal-judicial-power.htmlFederal Judicial Power/Federal Judicial Power.mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 21:54:28 GMTEx Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1869)., the Court must dismiss a case if Congress withdraws that jurisdiction while the case is pending. Jurisdiction is a threshold requirement. Without it, the Court cannot act, regardless of the merits.
Congressional jurisdiction-stripping is not a due process or separation of powers violation (at least as the Court holds in McCardle). The Court's appellate jurisdiction is granted by the Constitution, but it is defined and bounded by Congress.
Rule: Congress may not use statutory directives as a weapon to control the outcome of a specific case. Prescribing a rule of decision that compels a predetermined result crosses the line from legitimate legislation to interference with the judicial power. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871).. Congress can validly change the underlying substantive law, and courts must apply that new law. However, Congress cannot simultaneously strip jurisdiction and direct that the stripping itself operates as a judgment against a party.
Rule: Congress may not enact legislation that requires federal courts to reopen final judgments. Once a case has reached a final judgment, Article III prohibits Congress from retroactively commanding the judiciary to revise or set aside that decision, as doing so violates the separation of powers. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995). There are five limits to the justiciability of the judiciary. Two of these—advisory opinions and political questions—are prohibitions, and the final three—standing, ripeness, mootness—are doctrines on the cases and parties thereto.]]>federal-judicial-power/congressional-limits-on-judicial-power-(pp.-12–18)/congressional-limits-on-judicial-power-(pp.-12–18).htmlFederal Judicial Power/Congressional Limits on Judicial Power (pp. 12–18)/Congressional Limits on Judicial Power (pp. 12–18).mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 21:21:20 GMTNLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Wickard v. Filburn ]]>federal-legislative-power/commerce-power-(pp.-129–181)/new-deal-era-(expansive-commerce-power)/new-deal-era-(expansive-commerce-power).htmlFederal Legislative Power/Commerce Power (pp. 129–181)/New Deal Era (Expansive Commerce Power)/New Deal Era (Expansive Commerce Power).mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 21:14:31 GMTGonzales v. Raich
U.S. v. Lopez
U.S. v. Morrison ]]>federal-legislative-power/modern-limits-(pp.-157–181)/modern-limits-(pp.-157–181).htmlFederal Legislative Power/Modern Limits (pp. 157–181)/Modern Limits (pp. 157–181).mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 21:14:11 GMTGibbons v. Ogden ]]>federal-legislative-power/commerce-power-(pp.-129–181)/foundational-era-(pp.-129–143)/foundational-era-(pp.-129–143).htmlFederal Legislative Power/Commerce Power (pp. 129–181)/Foundational Era (pp. 129–143)/Foundational Era (pp. 129–143).mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 21:13:43 GMTTrump v. CASA ]]>federal-judicial-power/universal-injunctions-(supp.-pp.-1–25)/universal-injunctions-(supp.-pp.-1–25).htmlFederal Judicial Power/Universal Injunctions (Supp. pp. 1–25)/Universal Injunctions (Supp. pp. 1–25).mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 21:04:42 GMTD.C. v. Heller ]]>federal-judicial-power/theories-of-interpretation-(pp.-10–12;-heller-pp.-914–929)/theories-of-interpretation-(pp.-10–12;-heller-pp.-914–929).htmlFederal Judicial Power/Theories of Interpretation (pp. 10–12; Heller pp. 914–929)/Theories of Interpretation (pp. 10–12; Heller pp. 914–929).mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 21:04:05 GMTAdvisory Opinions (pp. 18–34): "would a decision on this issue actually mean anything?"
Standing (pp. 18–34): "who may sue?" Scalia: Standing basically asks "what's it to you?"
Ripeness (pp. 62–76): "is there/will there imminently be a cause of action?"
Mootness: "has this already been resolved?"
Political Question Doctrine (pp. 62–76): "is this a legal question or a political question?" ]]>federal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/justiciability-doctrines.htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Justiciability Doctrines.mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 21:01:59 GMTSpendthrift Farm, the Court ruled that Congress tried to change the Court’s ability to render a final decision on the outcome of the shareholders’ actions. However, such would be a retroactive application of law, and thus result in an advisory opinion.
Contrast Spendthrift Farm with Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933). Congress can make new laws apply retroactively: Courts must then apply the law in reviewing judgments still on appeal that were rendered before the law in question was enacted. The distinction, thus, is between cases where judgment was already rendered and appeals were exhausted, and cases where judgment was rendered but appeals are still pending. If Congress could retroactively apply the law, then the Judiciary's opinions would be nothing more than advisory. In essence, the test for an Advisory Opinion goes: is there an actual dispute between adverse litigants? If yes, move on. If no, stop. Will result in an advisory opinion. is there a substantial likelihood that a federal court decision in favor of a claimant will bring about some change or have some affect? If yes, move on. If no, stop. Will result in an advisory opinion. ]]>federal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/advisory-opinions-(pp.-18–34)/advisory-opinions-(pp.-18–34).htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Advisory Opinions (pp. 18–34)/Advisory Opinions (pp. 18–34).mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 20:59:41 GMTfederal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/advisory-opinions-(pp.-18–34)/nashville-c.-&-st.-l.-ry.-v.-wallace,-288-u.s.-249-(1933)..htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Advisory Opinions (pp. 18–34)/Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933)..mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 20:58:52 GMTfederal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/mootness/capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review/moore-v.-ogilvie,-394-u.s.-814-(1969)..htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Mootness/Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review/Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969)..mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 20:49:06 GMTU.S. Parole Commission, the Court found that—even if, with no change, the plaintiff's action will reoccur, you can still avoid mootness with an attempted class certification before the end of the suit. ]]>federal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/mootness/class-action-exceptions/class-action-exceptions.htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Mootness/Class Action Exceptions/Class Action Exceptions.mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 20:48:56 GMTU.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980).. If the Court rendered an opinion on an issue that is no longer in controversy, then it would be issuing an Advisory Opinion. This doctrine is less strict than other doctrines. The Court has recognized the "flexible character of the Article III mootness doctrine." There are three exceptions to the mootness doctrine:
Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review
Voluntary Cessation
Class Action Exceptions ]]>federal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/mootness/mootness.htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Mootness/Mootness.mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 20:48:56 GMTBaker v. Carr. ]]>federal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/political-question-doctrine-(pp.-62–76)/political-question-doctrine-(pp.-62–76).htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Political Question Doctrine (pp. 62–76)/Political Question Doctrine (pp. 62–76).mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 20:48:48 GMTfederal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/political-question-doctrine-(pp.-62–76)/baker-v.-carr,-369-u.s.-186-(1962)..htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Political Question Doctrine (pp. 62–76)/Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)..mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 20:47:34 GMTFriends of the Earth, the issue was ruled not to be moot because—even though ∆ stopped pouring mercury-laiden waste into the environment—it did so voluntarily. ∆ didn't convince the Court that the challenged conduct wouldn't ever reasonably reoccur. ]]>federal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/mootness/voluntary-cessation/voluntary-cessation.htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Mootness/Voluntary Cessation/Voluntary Cessation.mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 20:34:43 GMTfederal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/mootness/capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review/defunis-v.-odegaard,-416-u.s.-312-(1974)..htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Mootness/Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review/DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974)..mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 20:31:28 GMTRoe v. Wade, the Court found that Roe's case was not moot—even though she had already had her child—because pregnancy is something that can be repeated; however, when suits regarding legal injuries suffered in pregnancy reach the relevant court, the pregnancy is usually completed. If the Court dismissed for mootness, then every pregnancy-based claim would be moot and constantly evade review.
Ex 2: In Moore v. Ogilvie, the Court found that legal injuries suffered during or regarding elections, too, are things that are capable of repetition, yet evading review.
Ex 3: However, in DeFunis v. Odegaard, the Court found that the issue there was moot because he was able to attend law school at the University of Washington, and he was able to enjoy the benefits of the school—even if he was discriminated against. ]]>federal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/mootness/capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review/capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review.htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Mootness/Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review/Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review.mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 20:30:28 GMTfederal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/ripeness-(pp.-62–76)/303-creative-llc-v.-elenis,-143-s.-ct.-2298-(2023)..htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Ripeness (pp. 62–76)/303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 143 S. Ct. 2298 (2023)..mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 20:11:00 GMTfederal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/ripeness-(pp.-62–76)/susan-b.-anthony-list-v.-driehaus,-573-u.s.-149-(2014)..htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Ripeness (pp. 62–76)/Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014)..mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 20:09:07 GMTfederal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/ripeness-(pp.-62–76)/lake-carriers'-ass'n-v.-macmullan,-406-u.s.-498-(1972)..htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Ripeness (pp. 62–76)/Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972)..mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 20:07:40 GMTfederal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/ripeness-(pp.-62–76)/regional-rail-reorganization-act-cases,-419-u.s.-102-(1974)..htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Ripeness (pp. 62–76)/Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974)..mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 20:06:49 GMTfederal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/ripeness-(pp.-62–76)/united-public-workers-v.-mitchell,-330-u.s.-75-(1947)..htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Ripeness (pp. 62–76)/United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947)..mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 20:00:16 GMTfederal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/mootness/class-action-exceptions/u.s.-parole-commission-v.-geraghty,-445-u.s.-388-(1980)..htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Mootness/Class Action Exceptions/U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980)..mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 19:25:45 GMTfederal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/mootness/voluntary-cessation/friends-of-the-earth-v.-laidlaw-environmental-services,-528-u.s.-167-(2000)..htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Mootness/Voluntary Cessation/Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167 (2000)..mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 19:25:42 GMTfederal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/ripeness-(pp.-62–76)/abbott-laboratories-v.-gardner,-387-u.s.-136-(1967)..htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Ripeness (pp. 62–76)/Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)..mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 19:25:41 GMTfederal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/ripeness-(pp.-62–76)/poe-v.-ullman,-367-u.s.-497-(1961).htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Ripeness (pp. 62–76)/Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 19:25:40 GMTfederal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/standing-(pp.-18–34)/allen-v.-wright.htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Standing (pp. 18–34)/Allen v. Wright.mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 19:25:30 GMTfederal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/standing-(pp.-18–34)/massachusetts-v.-epa.htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Standing (pp. 18–34)/Massachusetts v. EPA.mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 19:25:24 GMTAllen v. Wright. Injunction Relief Standard: a π seeking injunctive or declaratory relief must show a likelihood of future harm that the relief would proactively remedy. Traceability (Causation): the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's actions; the plaintiff must allege and prove that hte defendant is the cause of the injury.
See Allen v. Wright. Redressability: the plaintiff must prove that a favorable federal court decision is likely to redress the injury. Essentially: "what's it to you?" Basic Requirements: a party generally may assert only his or her own rights and cannot raise the claims of third parties not before the court; Exceptions: a π may present a claim of a third party if there's a sufficiently close relationship between the π and the third party, Ex: doctor/patient privity.
See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). if the injured third party is unlikely to be able to assert his or her own rights, if there's reason to believe that the third party can't come to court to protect himself or herself. in this instance, then, the π—who meets the other requirements—may present these claims as well. a π may not sue as a taxpayer or citizen who shares a grievance in common with all other taxpayers and citizens. Exception: taxpayers have standing to challenge government expenditures pursuant to a statute that is violating Article I's Establishment Clause. ]]>federal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/standing-(pp.-18–34)/standing-(pp.-18–34).htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Standing (pp. 18–34)/Standing (pp. 18–34).mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 19:23:31 GMTfederal-judicial-power/justiciability-doctrines/advisory-opinions-(pp.-18–34)/plaut-v.-spendthrift-farm,-inc.,-514-u.s.-211-(1995)..htmlFederal Judicial Power/Justiciability Doctrines/Advisory Opinions (pp. 18–34)/Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995)..mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 19:02:45 GMTfederal-judicial-power/congressional-limits-on-judicial-power-(pp.-12–18)/united-states-v.-klein,-80-u.s.-128-(1871)..htmlFederal Judicial Power/Congressional Limits on Judicial Power (pp. 12–18)/United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871)..mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 19:00:12 GMTU.S. Const. Art. III, in § 2.
Yes. While the SC's appellate jurx. is derived from Art. III, it is ultimately conferred "with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make" in § 2. Here, Congress had previously affirmed the Supreme Court’s exercise of appellate jurisdiction over habeas corpus actions in its 1867 act but repealed that provision of the act in 1868. By doing so, Congress exercised its constitutional right to limit Supreme Court jurisdiction. Thus, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to consider McCardle’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Takeaway: Although the United States Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction is derived from Article III of the Constitution, it is conferred subject to whatever exceptions and regulations Congress chooses to make. ]]>federal-judicial-power/congressional-limits-on-judicial-power-(pp.-12–18)/ex-parte-mccardle,-74-u.s.-506-(1869)..htmlFederal Judicial Power/Congressional Limits on Judicial Power (pp. 12–18)/Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1869)..mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 18:49:51 GMTfederal-judicial-power/u.s.-const.-art.-iii/§-3.htmlFederal Judicial Power/U.S. Const. Art. III/§ 3.mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 18:46:56 GMTfederal-judicial-power/u.s.-const.-art.-iii/u.s.-const.-art.-iii.htmlFederal Judicial Power/U.S. Const. Art. III/U.S. Const. Art. III.mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 18:46:52 GMTbetween a State and Citizens of another State,—between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.]]>federal-judicial-power/u.s.-const.-art.-iii/§-2.htmlFederal Judicial Power/U.S. Const. Art. III/§ 2.mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 18:46:48 GMTfederal-judicial-power/u.s.-const.-art.-iii/§-1.htmlFederal Judicial Power/U.S. Const. Art. III/§ 1.mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 18:46:30 GMTfederal-judicial-power/judicial-review-(pp.-1–9)/marbury-v.-madison.htmlFederal Judicial Power/Judicial Review (pp. 1–9)/Marbury v. Madison.mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 18:03:28 GMTMarbury v. Madison. Nonjusticiable Political Acts: No judicial review where executive officials act as political or confidential agents of the President. Applies when actions involve constitutional or discretionary authority. These acts are committed (kept within) the executive branch. Justiciable Legal Duties: Judicial review is available where: an executive officer has a specific duty assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty. Where there is a legal right, there must be a legal remedy for that right. Rule: The judiciary has a duty to interpret the law and determine whether the Acts of Congress are consistent with the Constitution. If a statute conflicts with the Constitution, the Court must declare it unconstitutional and refuse to enforce it.
See Marbury v. Madison. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Courts must determine whether a statute conflicts with the Constitution. If a conflict exists, then the Constitution controls and the statute is invalid. A written Constitution would be meaningless if Congress could pass laws contrary to it. ]]>federal-judicial-power/judicial-review-(pp.-1–9)/judicial-review-(pp.-1–9).htmlFederal Judicial Power/Judicial Review (pp. 1–9)/Judicial Review (pp. 1–9).mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 17:57:05 GMTfederal-legislative-power/commerce-power-(pp.-129–181)/foundational-era-(pp.-129–143)/gibbons-v.-ogden.htmlFederal Legislative Power/Commerce Power (pp. 129–181)/Foundational Era (pp. 129–143)/Gibbons v. Ogden.mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 17:32:32 GMTfederal-legislative-power/post-civil-war-amendments-(pp.-207–218)/city-of-boerne-v.-flores.htmlFederal Legislative Power/Post-Civil War Amendments (pp. 207–218)/City of Boerne v. Flores.mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 17:32:32 GMTfederal-legislative-power/post-civil-war-amendments-(pp.-207–218)/shelby-county-v.-holder.htmlFederal Legislative Power/Post-Civil War Amendments (pp. 207–218)/Shelby County v. Holder.mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 17:32:32 GMTfederal-judicial-power/universal-injunctions-(supp.-pp.-1–25)/trump-v.-casa.htmlFederal Judicial Power/Universal Injunctions (Supp. pp. 1–25)/Trump v. CASA.mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 17:32:32 GMTfederal-judicial-power/theories-of-interpretation-(pp.-10–12;-heller-pp.-914–929)/d.c.-v.-heller.htmlFederal Judicial Power/Theories of Interpretation (pp. 10–12; Heller pp. 914–929)/D.C. v. Heller.mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 17:32:32 GMTcivil-&-economic-liberties/incorporation-(pp.-447–448,-458–474)/adamson-v.-california.htmlCivil & Economic Liberties/Incorporation (pp. 447–448, 458–474)/Adamson v. California.mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 17:32:32 GMTcivil-&-economic-liberties/incorporation-(pp.-447–448,-458–474)/palko-v.-connecticut.htmlCivil & Economic Liberties/Incorporation (pp. 447–448, 458–474)/Palko v. Connecticut.mdSun, 26 Apr 2026 17:32:32 GMT