Facts: π brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. § 1983 requires that prisoners exhaust administrative remedies. π did not exhaust before filing. ∆ claimed an affirmative defense of non-exhaustion. Case now in SCOTUS.
Issue: Whether Jones's claim is precludable by the affirmative defense of non-exhaustion, as provided by negative implication of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Rule: FRCP 8(c) is not exhaustive, so affirmative defenses of statutory negitve implication are permissible.
Holding: Yes, and—if the defense is proven—then π's claim is precluded, as ∆ has to plead an affirmative defense.
Reasoning: Congress could had clarified that π needed to plead exhaustion, but—because they didn't—the Court doesn't want to depart from federal practices. And, because 8(c) is non-exhaustive, statutory defenses by negative implication can be slotted in there.
Michalski: "by not specifying the way that it goes—we assume that Congress intended for it to go to the affirmative defense part of the FRCP where it always goes."